It is this individual influence, which may thus be exerted by the profession, that must be relied upon as one of the principal means of ridding the public of the evils of quackery. It is not a mere occasional effort—some address, some short article in a public journal, some fling of biting sarcasm, or some sally of wit—that will do it. Men of strong sense and good judgment, when they are led into error, as such men often are on the subject of medicine, are not to be delivered from that error by such means. Remedies of a more searching character, and a treatment more patient, thorough, and persevering, are required to reach their case. It is very desirable that this individual influence be exerted by medical men, because the class of persons to whom I have alluded, and who may be successfully reached by it, are the chief pillars of empiricism. It is true, I will allow, that the ignorant, the enthusiastic, and the novelty-seeking, make up the great mass of the patrons of quackery; but they are kept in countenance by those men of acknowledged good sense, who are found in considerable numbers in every community, supporting empiricism in some of its many forms by the weight of their example. The plain unlettered man who takes some patent medicine, is encouraged to do so by the example of some neighbor of general repute for shrewdness and wisdom, or perhaps of commanding talents and influence, and by the array of great names which he sometimes sees appended to certificates. A sort of general license is thus given to empiricism by this occasional endorsement by men of this character. Some other reasons, besides those already mentioned, for the want of success in efforts for the overthrow of quackery, remain to be noticed. The credulity in the public mind, that gives rise to the errors on which quackery is based, is encouraged by a similar credulity existing, to a considerable extent, in the medical profession itself. If the physician is seen to believe upon mere plausible evidence one thing, his friends will feel justified in believing some other thing resting on similar evidence. If he is not careful in sifting evidence, he cannot expect that others around him will be. If he, for example, give full credence to all the juggleries of animal magnetism, and all the extravagancies of phrenology, as they are put forth by travelling lecturers, how can he hope to dissuade an undiscriminating public from exercising a like credulity, in regard to the pretensions of quackery, which are not a whit more extravagant and fallacious?