There are many illustrations, used by those who advocate deception, which are plausible but fallacious. I will cite a single example. Dr. Hutcheson of Glasgow, as quoted by Dr. Percival, in remarking on the maxim, that we must not do evil that good may come, says, “Must one do nothing for a good purpose, which would have been evil without this reference? It is evil to hazard life without a view of some good; but when it is necessary for a public interest, it is very lovely and honorable. It is criminal to expose a good man to danger for nothing; but it is just even to force him into the greatest dangers for his country. It is criminal to occasion any pain to innocent persons, without a view to some good; but for restoring of health we reward chirurgeons for scarifyings, burnings, and amputations.” I would remark on this that the infliction of pain is not in itself a moral act, but the purpose for which it is done gives it all the moral character that it has. Aside from this, it affects no moral principle, as the infliction of an injury upon truth certainly does, independent of the object for which it is done. The infliction of pain then for a good purpose can not be said to be doing evil that good may come—it is doing good. The sacrifice of life which the writer speaks of, is the sacrifice of a less good for a greater one simply, and not the sacrifice of any principle. But when the truth is sacrificed for what is deemed to be a greater good, it is in fact the sacrifice of a greater good, for not only a less, but an uncertain good—a sacrifice of the eternal principle, which binds together the moral universe in harmony, for a mere temporary good, which after all may prove to be a shadow instead of a reality. I can not leave this subject without making some explanations of a few points, in order to guard against some erroneous inferences to which the sentiments that I have advanced might otherwise be liable. I wish not to be understood as saying that we should never take pains to withhold knowledge from the sick, which we fear might be injurious to them. There are cases in which this should be done. All that I claim is this—that in withholding the truth no deception should be practised, and that if sacrifice of the truth be the necessary price for obtaining the object, no such sacrifice should be made. In the passage which I have quoted from Dr. Percival, he states a case in which he very properly says, that the patient’s right to the truth is suspended; but I do not agree with him, that in withholding the truth we have the right to _put absolute falsehood in its place_.