No onward movement was made until the 26th of October. In the meanwhile, President Lincoln, visiting the Army of McClellan on the first of the month, had discussed the whole campaign with that officer, and had personally inspected the battle-field of Antietam; then, returning to Washington, he had, through General Halleck, issued an order to General McClellan, directing him to cross the Potomac and attack General Lee. It was in pursuance of this order that the advance was commenced on the 26th—the intermediate days having been spent in the work of reorganization. But this work had not been accomplished without difficulty. On the 10th of October, the rebel General Stuart crossed the Potomac, at McCoy’s Ferry, leading a force of two thousand cavalry and a battery of horse artillery, and made a raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania. Means were immediately taken to cut off and capture those forces. All the fords of the river were ordered to be guarded, and Generals Pleasanton and Stoneman started in pursuit. General Stuart, by his raid of the 13th of June, into the rear of the Union armies between the Pamunkey and the Chickahominy, had acquired great credit for boldness and celerity of movement. Hence the desire to capture him was all the more eager, on the part of the National troops. But the failure of a subordinate officer of General Stoneman’s to seasonably occupy White’s Ford, a point about three miles below the mouth of the Monocacy, unfortunately left open a chance of retreat, through which, on the 12th of October Stuart succeeded in making his escape, after a conflict with the Union forces, which lasted upwards of four hours. The fight took place near the mouth of the river Monocacy, and, on the Union side, was conducted by General Pleasanton. The losses were slight, upon both sides. The plan of General McClellan’s new campaign, commencing on the 26th of October, may best be stated in his own language: “The plan of campaign I adopted during this advantage was to move the army, well in hand, parallel to the Blue Ridge, taking Warrenton as the point of direction for the main army; seizing each pass on the Blue Ridge by detachments, as we approached it, and guarding them after we had passed as long as they would enable the enemy to trouble our communications with the Potomac. It was expected that we would unite with the Eleventh corps and Sickles’s division near Thoroughfare Gap. We depended upon Harper’s Ferry and Berlin for supplies until the Manassas Gap Railway was reached; when that occurred, the passes in the rear were to be abandoned, and the army massed ready for action or movement in any direction. “It was my intention if upon reaching Ashby’s or any other pass, I found that the enemy were in force between it and the Potomac in the valley of the Shenandoah, to move into the valley and endeavor to gain their rear.