Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 1Grote, George
Philosophy
Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 1
Grote, George
Philosophy, Ancient; Plato; Socrates, 470 BC-399 BC
In what manner Diodorus stated and defended his opinion upon this
point, we have no information. We know only that he placed
affirmations respecting the future on the same footing as affirmations
respecting the past: maintaining that our potential affirmation--_May
or May not be_--respecting some future event, meant no more than it
means respecting some past event, viz.: no inherent indeterminateness
in the future sequence, but our ignorance of the determining
conditions, and our inability to calculate their combined working.[66]
In regard to scientific method generally, this problem is of the
highest importance: for it is only so far as uniformity of sequence
prevails, that facts become fit matter for scientific study.[67]
Consistently with the doctrine of all-pervading uniformity of
sequence, the definition of Hobbes gives the only complete account of
the Impossible and Possible: _i.e._ an account such as would appear to
an omniscient calculator, where _May or May not_ merge in _Will or
Will not_. According as each person falls short of or approaches this
ideal standard--according to his knowledge and mental resource,
inductive and deductive--will be his appreciation of what may be or
may not be--as of what may have been or may not have been during the
past. But such appreciation, being relative to each individual mind,
is liable to vary indefinitely, and does not admit of being embodied
in one general definition.
[Footnote 66: The same doctrine as that of the Megaric Diodorus is
declared by Hobbes in clear and explicit language (First Grounds of
Philosophy, ii. 10, 4-5):--"That is an impossible act, for the
production of which there is no power plenary. For seeing plenary
power is that in which all things concur which are requisite for the
production of an act,** if the power shall never be plenary, there will
always be wanting some of those things, without which the act cannot
be produced. Wherefore that act shall never be produced: that is, that
act is _impossible_. And every act, which is not impossible, is
_possible_. Every act therefore which is possible, shall at some time
or other be produced. For if it shall never be produced, then those
things shall never concur which are requisite for the production of
it; wherefore the act is _impossible_, by the definition; which is
contrary to what was supposed.
"A _necessary act_ is that, the production of which it is impossible
to hinder: and therefore every act that shall be produced, shall
necessarily be produced; for that it shall not be produced is
impossible, because, as has already been demonstrated, every possible
act shall at some time be produced. Nay, this proposition--_What shall
be shall be_--is as necessary a proposition as this--_A man is a man_.
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