Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 1Grote, George
Philosophy
Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 1
Grote, George
Philosophy, Ancient; Plato; Socrates, 470 BC-399 BC
[Side-note: Reasonings of Diodôrus--respecting Hypothetical
Propositions--respecting Motion. His difficulties about the _Now_ of
time.]
But if he reproduced the arguments of Zeno, he also employed another,
peculiar to himself. He admitted the reality of _past_ motion: but he
denied the reality of _present_ motion. You may affirm truly (he said)
that a thing _has been moved_: but you cannot truly affirm that any
thing _is being moved_. Since it was _here_ before, and is _there_
now, you may be sure that it has been moved: but actual present motion
you cannot perceive or prove. Affirmation in the perfect tense may be
true, when affirmation in the present tense neither is nor ever was
true: thus it is true to say--Helen _had_ three husbands (Menelaus,
Paris, Deiphobus): but it was never true to say--Helen _has_ three
husbands, since they became her husbands in succession.[69] Diodorus
supported this paradox by some ingenious arguments, and the opinion
which he denied seems to have presented itself to him as involving the
position of indivisible minima--atoms of body, points of space,
instants of time. He admitted such minima of atoms, but not of space
or time: and without such admission he could not make intelligible to
himself the fact of present or actual motion. He could find no present
_Now_ or Minimum of Time; without which neither could any present
motion be found. Plato in the Parmenidês[70] professes to have found
this inexplicable moment of transition, but he describes it in terms
not likely to satisfy a dialectical mind: and Aristotle denying that
the Now is any portion or constituent part of time, considers it only
as a boundary of the past and future.[71]
[Footnote 69: Sextus Empir. adv. Mathemat. x. pp. 85-101.]
[Footnote 70: Plato, Parmenidês, p. 156 D-E. [Greek: Po/t' ou)=n,
metaba/llei? ou)/te ga\r e(sto\s a)\n ou)/te kenou/menon meta/balloi,
ou)/te e)n chro/nô| o)/n]. (Here Plato adverts to the difficulties
attending the supposition of actual [Greek: metabolê/], as Diodorus to
those of actual [Greek: ki/nêsis]. Next we have Plato's hypothesis for
getting over the difficulties.) [Greek: A)=r' ou)=n e)sti/ to\
a)/topon tou=to, e)n ô)=| to/t' a)\n ei)/ê o(/te metaba/llei? To\
poi=on dê/? _To\ e)xai/phnês; ê( e)xai/phnês au)/tê phu/sis a)/topos_
tis e)gka/thêtai metaxu\ tê=s kinê/seôs te kai\ sta/seôs, e)n chro/nô|
ou)deni\ ou)=sa, kai\ ei)s tau/tên dê\ kai\ e)k tau/tês to/ te
kinou/menon metaba/llei e)pi\ to\ e)sta/nai kai\ to\ e)sto\s e)pi\ to\
kinei=sthai].
Diodorus could not make out this [Greek: phu/sis a)/topos] which Plato
calls [Greek: to\ e)xai/phnês].]
[Footnote 71: To illustrate this apparent paradox of Diodorus,
affirming past motion, but denying present motion, we may compare what
is said by Aristotle about the Now or Point of Present Time--that it
is not a part, but a boundary between Past and Future.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account