Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 1Grote, George
Philosophy
Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 1
Grote, George
Philosophy, Ancient; Plato; Socrates, 470 BC-399 BC
[Side-note: Analogous difficulties in the Platonic Parmenidês.]
Stilpon was not the first who had difficulty in explaining to himself
how one and the same predicate could be applied to many different
subjects. The difficulty had already been set forth in the Platonic
Parmenidês.[133] How can the Form (Man, White, Good, &c.) be present
at one and the same time in many distinct individuals? It cannot be
present as a whole in each: nor can it be divided, and thus present
partly in one, partly in another. How therefore can it be present at
all in any of them? In other words, how can the One be Many, and how
can the Many be One? Of this difficulty (as of many others) Plato
presents no solution, either in the Parmenidês or anywhere else.[134]
Aristotle alludes to several contemporaries or predecessors who felt
it. Stilpon reproduces it in his own way. It is a very real
difficulty, requiring to be dealt with by those who lay down a theory
of predication; and calling upon them to explain the functions of
general propositions, and the meaning of general terms.
[Footnote 133: Plato, Parmenidês, p. 131. Compare also Philêbus, p.
15, and Stallbaum's Proleg. to the Parmenidês, pp. 46-47. The long
commentary of Proklus (v. 100-110. pp. 670-682 of the edition of
Stallbaum) amply attests the [Greek: duskoli/an] of the problem.
The argument of Parmenidês (in the dialogue called Parmenidês) is
applied to the Platonic [Greek: ei)/dê] and to [Greek: ta\
mete/chonta]. But the argument is just as much applicable to
attributes, genera, species: to all general predicates.]
[Footnote 134: Aristot. Physic. i. 2, 185, b. 26-36.
Lykophron and some others anterior to Aristotle proposed to elude the
difficulty, by ceasing to use the substantive verb as copula in
predication: instead of saying [Greek: Sôkra/tês e)sti\ leuko/s], they
said either [Greek: Sôkra/tês leuko/s], simply, or [Greek: Sôkra/tês
leleu/kôtai].
This is a remarkable evidence of the difficulty arising, even in these
early days of logic, about the logical function of the copula.]
[Side-note: Menedêmus disallowed all negative predication.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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