[Footnote 172: Xenoph. Memor. iii. 8, 1. Both Xenophon and some of his commentators censure this as a captious string of questions put by Aristippus--'captiosas Aristippi quæstiunculas". Such a criticism is preposterous, when we recollect that Sokrates was continually examining and questioning others in the same manner. See in particular his cross-examination of Euthydêmus, reported by Xenophon, Memor. iv. 2; and many others like it, both in Xenophon and in Plato.] [Footnote 173: Xenoph. Memor. iii. 8, 1. [Greek: boulo/menos tou\s suno/ntas ô(phelei=n.]] Again, on another occasion Aristippus asked him "Do you know anything beautiful?--Yes; many things.--Are they all like to each other?--No; they are as unlike as possible to each other.--How then (continues Aristippus) can that which is unlike to the beautiful, be itself beautiful?--Easily enough (replies Sokrates); one man is beautiful for running; another man, altogether unlike him, is beautiful for wrestling. A shield which is beautiful for protecting your body, is altogether unlike to a javelin, which is beautiful for being swiftly and forcibly hurled.--Your answer (rejoined Aristippus) is exactly the same as it was when I asked you whether you knew anything good.--Certainly (replies Sokrates). Do you imagine, that the Good is one thing, and the Beautiful another? Do you not know that all things are good and beautiful in relation to the same purpose? Virtue is not good in relation to one purpose, and beautiful in relation to another. Men are called both good and beautiful in reference to the same ends: the bodies of men, in like manner: and all things which men use, are considered both good and beautiful, in consideration of their serving their ends well.--Then (says Aristippus) a basket for carrying dung is beautiful?--To be sure (replied Sokrates), and a golden shield is ugly; if the former be well made for doing its work, and the latter badly.--Do you then assert (asked Aristippus) that the same things are beautiful and ugly?--Assuredly (replied Sokrates); and the same things are both good and evil. That which is good for hunger, is often bad for a fever: that which is good for a fever, is often bad for hunger. What is beautiful for running is often ugly for wrestling--and _vice versâ_. All things are good and beautiful, in relation to the ends which they serve well: all things are evil and ugly, in relation to the ends which they serve badly."[174] [Footnote 174: Xenoph. Memor. iii. 8, 1-9.] [Side-note: Remarks on the conversation--Theory of Good.]