As all the works of Aristippus are lost, we cannot pretend to understand fully his theory from the meagre abstract given in Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes. Yet the theory is of importance in the history of ancient speculation, since it passed with some modifications to Epikurus, and was adopted by a large proportion of instructed men. The Kyrenaic doctrine was transmitted by Aristippus to his disciples Æthiops and Antipater: but his chief disciple appears to have been his daughter Arêtê: whom he instructed so well, that she was able to instruct her own son, the second Aristippus, called for that reason Metrodidactus. The basis of his ethical theory was, pleasure and pain: pleasure being _smooth motion_, pain, _rough motion_:[206] pleasure being the object which all animals, by nature and without deliberation, loved, pursued, and felt satisfaction in obtaining pain being the object which they all by nature hated and tried to avoid. Aristippus considered that no one pleasure was different from another, nor more pleasurable than another:[207] that the attainment of these special pleasurable moments, or as many of them as practicable, was The End to be pursued in life. By _Happiness_, they understood the sum total of these special pleasures, past, present, and future: yet Happiness was desirable not on its own account, but on account of its constituent items, especially such of those items as were present and certainly future.[208] Pleasures and pains of memory and expectation were considered to be of little importance. Absence of pain or relief from pain, on the one hand--they did not consider as equivalent to positive pleasure--nor absence of pleasure or withdrawal of pleasure, on the other hand--as equivalent to positive pain. Neither the one situation nor the other was a _motion_ ([Greek: ki/nêsis]), _i.e._ a positive situation, appreciable by the consciousness: each was a middle state--a mere negation of consciousness, like the phenomena of sleep.[209] They recognised some mental pleasures and pains as derivative from bodily sensation and as exclusively individual--others as not so: for example, there were pleasures and pains of sympathy; and a man often felt joy at the prosperity of his friends and countrymen, quite as genuine as that which he felt for his own good fortune. But they maintained that the bodily pleasures and pains were much more vehement than the mental which were not bodily: for which reason, the pains employed by the laws in punishing offenders were chiefly bodily. The fear of pain was in their judgments more operative than the love of pleasure: and though pleasure was desirable for its own sake, yet the accompanying conditions of many pleasures were so painful as to deter the prudent man from aiming at them. These obstructions rendered it impossible for any one to realise the sum total of pleasures constituting Happiness. Even the wise man sometimes failed, and the foolish man sometimes did well, though in general the