Aristippus regarded prudence or wisdom as good, yet not as good _per se_, but by reason of the pleasures which it enabled us to procure and the pains which it enabled us to avoid--and wealth as a good, for the same reason. A friend also was valuable, for the use and necessities of life: just as each part of one's own body was precious, so long as it was present and could serve a useful purpose.[211] Some branches of virtue might be possessed by persons who were not wise: and bodily training was a valuable auxiliary to virtue. Even the wise man could never escape pain and fear, for both of these were natural: but he would keep clear of envy, passionate love, and superstition, which were not natural, but consequences of vain opinion. A thorough acquaintance with the real nature of Good and Evil would relieve him from superstition as well as from the fear of death.[212] [Footnote 211: Diog. L. ii. 91. [Greek: tê\n phro/nêsin a)gatho\n me\n ei)=nai le/gousin, ou) di' e(autê\n de\ ai(retê/n, a)lla\ dia\ ta\ e)x au)tê=s perigino/mena; to\n phi/lon tê=s chrei/as e(/neka; kai\ ga\r me/ros sô/matos, me/chris a)\n parê=|, a)spa/zesthai]. The like comparison is employed by the Xenophontic Sokrates in the Memorabilia (i. 2, 52-55), that men cast away portions of their own body, so soon as these portions cease to be useful.] [Footnote 212: Diog. L. ii. p. 92.] The Kyrenaics did not admit that there was anything just, or honourable, or base, by nature: but only by law and custom: nevertheless the wise man would be sufficiently restrained, by the fear of punishment and of discredit, from doing what was repugnant to the society in which he lived. They maintained that wisdom was attainable; that the senses did not at first judge truly, but might be improved by study; that progress was realised in philosophy as in other arts, and that there were different gradations of it, as well as different gradations of pain and suffering, discernible in different men. The wise man, as they conceived him, was a reality; not (like the wise man of the Stoics) a sublime but unattainable ideal.[213] [Footnote 213: Diog. L. ii. p. 93.] [Side-note: Their logical theory--nothing knowable except the phenomenal, our own sensations and feelings--no knowledge of the absolute.]