The language held by Aristippus to Sokrates, in the Xenophontic dialogue (Memor. ii. 1. 9), is exactly similar to that of the Platonic Sokrates, as above cited--[Greek: e)mauto\n ta/ttô ei)s tou\s boulome/nous ê(=| r(a=|sta/ te kai\ ê(/dista bioteu/ein.]] [Side-note: Difference in the manner of stating the theory by the two.] The theory here laid down by the Platonic Sokrates is the same as that of Aristippus. The purpose of life is stated almost in the same words by both: by the Platonic Sokrates, and by Aristippus in the Xenophontic dialogue--"to live through with enjoyment and without suffering." The Platonic Sokrates denies, quite as emphatically as Aristippus, any good or evil, honourable or base, except as representing the result of an intelligent comparison of pleasures and pains. Judicious calculation is postulated by both: pleasures and pains being assumed by both as the only ends of pursuit and avoidance, to which calculation is to be applied. The main difference is, that the prudence, art, or science, required for making this calculation rightly, are put forward by the Platonic Sokrates as the prominent item in his provision for passing through life: whereas, in the scheme of Aristippus, as far as we know it, such accomplished intelligence, though equally recognised and implied, is not equally thrust into the foreground. So it appears at least in the abstract which we possess of his theory; if we had his own exposition of it, perhaps we might find the case otherwise. In that abstract, indeed, we find the writer replying to those who affirmed prudence or knowledge, to be good _per se_--and maintaining that it is only good by reason of its consequences:[216] that is, that it is not good as End, in the same sense in which pleasure or mitigation, of pain are good. This point of the theory, however, coincides again with the doctrine of the Platonic Sokrates in the Protagoras: where the art of calculation is extolled simply as an indispensable condition to the most precious results of human happiness. [Footnote 216: Diog. L. ii. p. 91.]