Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 2Grote, George
Philosophy
Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 2
Grote, George
Philosophy, Ancient; Plato; Socrates, 470 BC-399 BC
How this comedy may be appreciated is doubtless a matter of
individual taste. For my part, I agree with Ast in thinking it
misplaced and unbecoming: and I am not surprised that he wishes to
remove the dialogue from the Platonic canon, though I do not concur
either in this inference, or in the general principle on which it
proceeds, viz., that all objections against the composition of a
dialogue are to be held as being also objections against its
genuineness as a work of Plato. The Nubes of Aristophanes, greatly
superior as a comedy to the Hippias of Plato, is turned to an abusive
purpose when critics put it into court as evidence about the
character of the real Sokrates.
K. F. Hermann, in my judgment, takes a more rational view of the
Hippias Major (Gesch. und Syst. der Plat. Phil. p. 487-647). Instead
of expatiating on the glory of Plato in deriding an accomplished
contemporary, he dwells upon the logical mistakes and confusion which
the dialogue brings to view; and he reminds us justly of the
intellectual condition of the age, when even elementary distinctions
in logic and grammar had been scarcely attended to.
Both K. F. Hermann and Socher consider the Hippias to be not a
juvenile production of Plato, but to belong to his middle age.]
[Footnote 2: Schleierm. Einleitung. p. 401; Ast, Platon's Leben und
Schriften, p. 457-459.]
[Side-note: Real debate between the historical Sokrates and
Hippias in the Xenophontic Memorabilia--subject of that debate.]
One considerable point in the Hippias Major appears to have a bearing
on the debate between Sokrates and Hippias in the Xenophontic
Memorabilia: in which debate, Hippias taunts Sokrates with always
combating and deriding the opinions of others, while evading to give
opinions of his own. It appears that some antecedent debates between
the two had turned upon the definition of the Just, and that on these
occasions Hippias had been the respondent, Sokrates the objector.
Hippias professes to have reflected upon these debates, and to be now
prepared with a definition which neither Sokrates nor any one else
can successfully assail, but he will not say what the definition is,
until Sokrates has laid down one of his own. In reply to this
challenge, Sokrates declares the Just to be equivalent to the Lawful
or Customary: he defends this against various objections of
Hippias, who concludes by admitting it.[3] Probably this debate, as
reported by Xenophon, or something very like it, really took place.
If so, we remark with surprise the feebleness of the objections of
Hippias, in a case where Sokrates, if he had been the objector, would
have found such strong ones--and the feeble replies given by
Sokrates, whose talent lay in starting and enforcing difficulties,
not in solving them.[4] Among the remarks which Sokrates makes in
illustration to Hippias, one is--that Lykurgus had ensured
superiority to Sparta by creating in the Spartans a habit of implicit
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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