_Sokr._--Nevertheless--it seems so: from what we have said. _Hip._--It does not seem so to me. _Sokr._--I thought that it would have seemed so to you, as it does to me. However, answer me once more--Is not justice either a certain mental capacity? or else knowledge? or both together?[66] _Hip._--Yes! it is. _Sokr._--If justice be a capacity of the mind, the more capable mind will also be the juster: and we have already seen that the more capable soul is the better. _Hip._--We have. _Sokr._--If it be knowledge, the more knowing or wiser mind will of course be the juster: if it be a combination of both capacity and knowledge, that mind which is more capable as well as more knowing,--will be the juster that which is less capable and less knowing, will be the more unjust. _Hip._--So it appears. _Sokr._--Now we have shown that the more capable and knowing mind is at once the better mind, and more competent to exert itself both ways--to do what is honourable as well as what is base--in every employment. _Hip._--Yes. _Sokr._--When, therefore, such a mind does what is base, it does so wilfully, through its capacity or intelligence, which we have seen to be of the nature of justice? _Hip._--It seems so. _Sokr._--Doing base things, is acting unjustly: doing honourable things, is acting justly. Accordingly, when this more capable and better mind acts unjustly, it will do so wilfully; while the less capable and worse mind will do so without willing it? _Hip._--Apparently. [Footnote 66: Plat. Hipp. Min. 375 D. [Greek: ê( dikaiosu/nê ou)chi ê)\ du/nami/s ti/s e)stin, ê)\ e)pistê/mê, ê)\ a)mpho/tera?]] [Side-note: Conclusion--That none but the good man can do evil wilfully: the bad man does evil unwillingly. Hippias cannot resist the reasoning, but will not accept the conclusion--Sokrates confesses his perplexity.] _Sokr._--Now the good man is he that has the good mind: the bad man is he that has the bad mind. It belongs therefore to the good man to do wrong wilfully, to the bad man, to do wrong without wishing it--that is, if the good man be he that has the good mind? _Hip._--But that is unquestionable--that he has it. _Sokr._--Accordingly, he that goes wrong and does base and unjust things wilfully, if there be any such character--can be no other than the good man. _Hip._--I do not know how to concede _that_ to you, Sokrates.[67] _Sokr._--Nor I, how to concede it to myself, Hippias: yet so it must appear to us, now at least, from the past debate. As I told you long ago, I waver hither and thither upon this matter; my conclusions never remain the same. No wonder indeed that I and other vulgar men waver; but if you wise men waver also, that becomes a fearful mischief even to us, since we cannot even by coming to you escape from our embarrassment.[68] [Footnote 67: Plat. Hipp. Min. 375 E, 376 B.] [Footnote 68: Plato, Hipp. Min. 376 C.] * * * * *