This reply, though scanty and undeveloped, is in my judgment both valid, as it negatives the Subject pure and simple, and affirms that to every conception in the mind, there must correspond a Concept out of (or rather along with) the mind (the one correlating with or implying the other)--and correct as far as it goes, in declaring what that Concept is. Such Concept is, or may be, the Form. Parmenides does not show that it is not so. He proceeds to impugn, by a second argument, the assertion of Sokrates--that the form is a Conception _wholly within_ the mind: he goes on to argue that individual things (which are _out_ of the mind) cannot participate in these Forms (which are asserted to be altogether _in_ the mind): because, if that were admitted, either every such thing must be a Concipient, or must run into the contradiction of being a _Conceptio non concipiens_.[35] Now this argument may refute the affirmation of Sokrates literally taken, that the Form is a Conception entirely belonging to the mind, and having nothing Objective corresponding to it--but does not refute the doctrine that the Form is a Concept correlating with the mind--or out of the mind as well as in it. In this as in other Concepts, the subjective point of view preponderates over the objective, though Object is not altogether eliminated: just as, in the particular external things, the objective point of view predominates, though Subject cannot be altogether dismissed. Neither Subject nor Object can ever entirely disappear: the one is the inseparable correlative and complement of the other: but sometimes the subjective point of view may preponderate, sometimes the objective. Such preponderance (or logical priority), either of the one or the other, may be implied or connoted by the denomination given. Though the special connotation of the name creates an illusion which makes the preponderant point of view seem to be all, and magnifies the Relatum so as to eclipse and extinguish the Correlatum--yet such preponderance, or logical priority, is all that is really meant when the Concepts are said to be "_in the mind_"--and the Percepts (Percepta, things perceived) to be "_out of the mind_": for both Concepts and Percepts are "_of the mind_, or _relative to the mind_".[36] [Footnote 35: On this point the argument in the dialogue itself, as stated by Parmenides, is not clear to follow. Strümpell remarks on the terms employed by Plato. "Der Umstand, dass die Ausdrücke [Greek: ei)=dos] und [Greek: i)de/a] nicht sowie [Greek: lo/gos] den Unterschied, zwischen Begriff und dem durch diesen begriffenen Realen, hervortreten lassen--sondern, weil dieselben bald im subjektiven Sinne den Begriff, bald im objektiven Sinne das Reale bezeichnen--bald in der einen bald in der andern Bedeutung zu nehmen sind--kann leicht eine Verwechselung und Unklarheit in der Auffassung veranlassen," &c. (Gesch. der Gr. Philos. s. 90, p. 115).]