"Eine arge Täuschung ist es, zu glauben, dass das principium identitatis et contradictionis oberstes logisches Princip des Plato sei . . Es ist gerade eine Hauptaufgabe, welche sich Plato stellen musste, die Coexistenz der Gegensätze nachzuweisen, wie diess bekanntlich im Philebus und _besonders im Parmenides_ geschieht." According to this view, the Antinomies in the Parmenides are all of them good proofs, and the conclusions of all of them, summed up as they are in the final sentence of the dialogue, constitute an addition to the positive knowledge of Sokrates. I confess that this to me is unintelligible. I understand these Antinomies as [Greek: a)pori/ai] to be cleared up, but in no other character. Prantl speaks (p. 73) of "die antinomische Begründung der Ideenlehre im Parmenides," &c. This is the same language as that used by Zeller, upon which I have already remarked.] [Side-note: Demonstration third--Attempt to reconcile the contradiction of Demonstrations I. and II.] How can this be possible? How can these four propositions all be true--_Unum est Unum_--_Unum est Multa_--_Unum non est Unum_--_Unum non est Multa_? Plato suggests a way out of the difficulty, in that which he gives as Demonstration 3. It has been shown that Unum "partakes of time"--was, is, and will be. The propositions are all true, but true at different times: one at this time, another at that time.[90] Unum acquires and loses existence, essence, and other attributes: _now_, it exists and is Unum--_before_, it did not exist and was not Unum: so too it is alternately like and unlike, in motion and at rest. But how is such alternation or change intelligible? At each time, whether present or past, it must be either in motion or at rest: at no time, neither present nor past, can it be _neither_ in motion _nor_ at rest. It cannot, while in motion, change to rest--nor, while at rest, change to motion. No time can be assigned for the change: neither the present, nor the past, nor the future: how then can the change occur at all?[91] [Footnote 90: This is a distinction analogous to that which Plato points out in the Sophistes (pp. 242-243) between the theories of Herakleitus and Empedoklês.] [Footnote 91: Plato, Parmenid. p. 156.] [Side-note: Plato's imagination of the Sudden or Instantaneous--Breaches or momentary stoppages in the course of time.]