The steps by which these conclusions are made out are extremely subtle, and hardly intelligible to me.] Having thus deduced from the fundamental principle this string of Both opposite predicates, the Platonic Parmenides reverts (in Demonstration 7) to the same principium (_Si Unum non est_) to deduce by another train of reasoning the Neither of these predicates. When you say that _Unum non est_, you must mean that it does not partake of existence in any way--absolutely and without reserve. It therefore neither acquires nor loses existence: it is neither generated nor destroyed: it is neither in motion nor at rest: it partakes of nothing existent: it is neither equal nor unequal--neither like nor unlike--neither great nor little--neither this, nor that: neither the object of perception, nor of knowledge, nor of opinion, nor of naming, nor of debate.[99] [Footnote 99: Plato, Parmenid. pp. 163-164 A.] [Side-note: Demonstration VII. is founded upon the genuine doctrine of Parmenides.] These two last counter-demonstrations (6 and 7), forming the third Antinomy, deserve attention in this respect--That the seventh is founded upon the genuine Parmenidean or Eleatic doctrine about Non-Ens, as not merely having no attributes, but as being unknowable, unperceivable, unnameable: while the sixth is founded upon a different apprehension of Non-Ens, which is explained and defended by Plato in the Sophistes, as a substitute for, and refutation of, the Eleatic doctrine.[100] According to Number 7, when you deny, of Unum, the predicate existence, you deny of it also all other predicates: and the name Unum is left without any subject to apply to. This is the Eleatic dogma. Unum having been declared to be Non-Ens, is (like Non-Ens) neither knowable nor nameable. According to Number 6, the proposition _Unum est non-Ens_, does not carry with it any such consequences. Existence is only one predicate, which may be denied of the subject Unum, but which, when denied, does not lead to the denial of all other predicates--nor, therefore, to the loss of the subject itself. Unum still remains Unum, knowable, and different from other things. Upon this first premiss are built up several other affirmations; so that we thus arrive circuitously at the affirmation of existence, in a certain way: _Unum_, though non-existent, does nevertheless exist _quodam modo_. This coincides with that which the Eleatic stranger seeks to prove in the Sophistes, against Parmenides. [Footnote 100: Plato, Sophistes, pp. 258-259.] [Side-note: Demonstrations VI. and VII. considered--Unwarrantable steps in the reasoning--The fundamental premiss differently interpreted, though the same in words.]