_Theætêt._ [Greek: ou)k a)/llo ti/ e)stin e)pistê/mê ê)\ ai)/sthêsis. . . .] _Sokrat._ [Greek: Kinduneu/eis me/ntoi lo/gon ou) phau=lon ei)rêke/nai peri\ e)pistê/mês, a)ll' o(/n e)/lege kai\ Prôtago/ras; _tro/pon de/ tina a)/llon ei)/rêke ta\ au)ta\ tau=ta. Phêsi\ ga/r pou--Pa/ntôn chrêma/tôn me/tron a)/nthrôpon ei)=nai, tô=n me\n o)/ntôn, ô(s e)/sti--tô=n de\ mê\ o)/ntôn, ô(s ou)k e)/stin._ A)ne/gnôkas ga/r pou?] _Theætêt._ [Greek: A)ne/gnôka kai\ polla/kis.] _Sokrat._ [Greek: Ou)kou=n ou(/tô pôs le/gei, ôs oi(=a me\n e(/kasta e)moi\ phai/netai, toiau=ta me/n e)stin e)moi\--oi(=a de\ soi/, toiau=ta de\ au)= soi/; a)nthrôpos de\ su/ te ka)gô/.] _Theætêt._ [Greek: Le/gei ga\r ou)=n ou(/tôs.] Here Plato appears to transcribe the words of Protagoras (compare p. 161 B, and the Kratylus, p. 386 A) which distinctly affirm the doctrine of _Homo Mensura_--Man is the measure of all things,--but do not affirm the doctrine, that knowledge is sensible perception. The identification between the two doctrines is asserted by Plato himself. It is Plato who asserts "that Protagoras affirmed the same doctrine in another manner," citing afterwards the manner in which he supposed Protagoras to affirm it. If there had been in the treatise of Protagoras any more express or peremptory affirmation of the doctrine "that knowledge is sensible perception," Plato would probably have given it here.] [Footnote 11: Plato, Theætêt. p. 152 E. [Greek: kai\ peri\ tou/tou _pa/ntes e(xê=s oi( sophoi\ plê\n Parmeni/dou xumphere/sthôn_, Prôtago/ras te kai\ Ê(ra/kleitos kai\ E)mpedoklê=s, kai\ tô=n poiêtô=n oi( a)/kroi tê=s poiê/seôs e(kate/ras, kômô|di/as me\n E)pi/charmos, tragô|di/as de\ O(/mêros.]] [Side-note: Plato here blends together three distinct theories for the purpose of confuting them; yet he also professes to urge what can be said in favour of them. Difficulty of following his exposition.]