In truth, the Protagorean measure or limit is even more plainly applicable to our mental intuitions and mental processes (remembering, imagining, conceiving, comparing, abstracting, combining of hypotheses, transcendental or inductive) than to the matter of our sensible experience.[25] In regard to the Entia Rationis, divergence between one theorist and another is quite as remarkable as the divergence between one percipient and another in the most disputable region of Entia Perceptionis. Upon the separate facts of sense, there is a nearer approach to unanimity among mankind, than upon the theories whereby theorising men connect together those facts to their own satisfaction. An opponent of Protagoras would draw his most plausible arguments from the undisputed facts of sense. He would appeal to matter and what are called its primary qualities, as refuting the doctrine. For in describing mental intuitions, Mind or Subject cannot well be overlaid or ignored: but in regard to the external world, or material substance with its primary qualities, the objective side is so lighted up and magnified in the ordinary conception and language--and the subjective side so darkened and put out of sight--that Object appears as if it stood single, apart, and independent. [Footnote 25: Bacon remarks that the processes called mental or intellectual are quite as much relative to man as those called sensational or perceptive. "Idola Tribûs sunt fundata in ipsâ naturâ humanâ. Falso enim asseritur, Sensum humanum esse mensuram rerum: quin contra, omnes perceptiones, tam Sensûs quam Mentis, sunt ex analogiâ hominis, non ex analogiâ Universi." Nemesius, the Christian Platonist, has a remark bearing upon this question. He says that the lower animals have their intellectual movements all determined by Nature, which acts alike in all the individuals of the species, but that the human intellect is not wholly determined by Nature; it has a freer range, larger stores of ideas, and more varied combinations: hence its manifestations are not the same in all, but different in different individuals--[Greek: e)leu/theron ga/r ti kai\ au)texou/sion to\ logiko/n, o(/then ou)ch e(\n kai\ tau)to\n pa=sin e)/rgon a)nthrô/pois, ô(s e(ka/stô| ei)/dei tô=n a)lo/gôn zô/ôn; phu/sei ga\r mo/nê| ta\ toiau=ta kinei=tai, ta\ de\ phu/sei o(moi/ôs para\ pa=si/n e)stin; ai( de\ logikai\ pra/xeis a)/llai par' a)/llois kai\ ou)k e)x a)na/gkês ai( au(=tai para\ pa=sin] (De Nat. Hom., c. ii. p. 53. ed. 1565).]