subjective on one side and objective on the other: and it assigns as the generating factors two concepts obtained by abstraction from these very acts,--resulting from multiplied comparisons,--and ultimately exaggerated into an illusion which treats the logical separation as if it were bisection in fact and reality. [Footnote 43: Aristotle, in a passage of the treatise De Animâ (iii. 1, 2-4-7-8, ed. Trendelenburg, p. 425, b. 25, p. 426, a. 15-25, Bekk.), impugns an opinion of certain antecedent [Greek: phusio/logoi] whom he does not specify; which opinion seems identical with the doctrine of Protagoras. These philosophers said, that "there was neither white nor black without vision, nor savour without the sense of taste". Aristotle says that they were partly right, partly wrong. They were right in regard to the actual, wrong in regard to the potential. The actual manifestation of the perceived is one and the same with that of the percipient, though the two are not the same logically in the view of the reflecting mind ([Greek: ê( de\ tou= ai)sthêtou= e)ne/rgeia kai\ tê=s ai)sthê/seôs ê( au)tê\ me/n e)sti kai\ mi/a, to\ d' ei)=nai ou) tau)to\n au)tai=s]). But this is not true when we speak of them potentially--[Greek: dichô=s ga\r legome/nês tê=s ai)sthê/seôs kai\ tou= ai)sthêtou=, tô=n me\n kata\ du/namin tô=n de\ kat' e)ne/rgeian, e)pi/ tou/tôn me\n sumbai/nei to\ lechthe/n, e)pi\ de\ tô=n e(te/rôn ou) sumbai/nei. A)ll' e)kei=noi a(plô=s e)/legon peri\ tô=n legome/nôn ou)ch a(plô=s.] I think that the distinction, which Aristotle insists upon as a confutation of these philosophers, is not well founded. What he states, in very just language, about _actual perception_ is equally true about _potential perception_. As the present fact of actual perception implicates essentially a determinate percipient subject with a determinate perceived object, and admits of being looked at either from the one point of view or from the other--so the concept of potential perception implicates in like manner an indeterminate perceivable with an indeterminate subject competent to perceive. The perceivable or cogitable has no meaning except in relation to some Capax Percipiendi or Capax Cogitandi.] [Footnote 44: The terms Ego and Mecum, to express the antithesis of these two [Greek: lo/gô| mo/non chôrista\], are used by Professor Ferrier in his very acute treatise, the Institutes of Metaphysic, pp. 93-96. The same antithesis is otherwise expressed by various modern writers in the terms Ego and non-Ego--le moi et le non-moi. I cannot think that this last is the proper way of expressing it. You do not want to negative the Ego, but to declare its essential implication with a variable correlate; to point out the bilateral character of the act of consciousness. The two are not merely _Relata secundum dici_ but _Relata secundum esse_, to use a distinction recognised in the scholastic logic.