[Footnote 82: Aristotle (Metaphysic. [Greek: G]. p. 1010, a. 25 seq.) in arguing against Herakleitus and his followers, who dwelt upon [Greek: ta\ ai)sthêta\] as ever fluctuating and undefinable, urges against them that this is not true of _all_ [Greek: ai)sthêta/], but only of those in the sublunary region of the Kosmos. But this region is (he says) only an imperceptibly small part of the entire Kosmos; the objects in the vast superlunary or celestial region of the Kosmos were far more numerous, and were also eternal and unchangeable, in constant and uniform circular rotation. Accordingly, if you predicate one or other about [Greek: ai)sthêta\] generally, you ought to predicate constancy and unchangeability, not flux and variation, since the former predicates are true of much the larger proportion of [Greek: ai)sthêta/]. See the Scholia on the above passage of Aristotle's Metaphysica, and also upon Book A. 991, a. 9.] [Footnote 83: Mr. Campbell, in his Preface to the Theætêtus (p. lxxxiii.), while comparing the points in the dialogue with modern metaphysical views, observes. "Modern Experimental Science is equally distrustful of individual impressions of sense, but has found means of measuring the motions by which they are caused, through _the effect of the same motions upon other things besides our senses_. When the same wind is blowing one of us feels warm and another cold (Theætêt. p. 152), but the mercury of the thermometer tells the same tale to all. And though the individual consciousness remains the sole judge of the exact impression momentarily received by each person, yet we are certain that the sensation of heat and cold, like the expansion and contraction of the mercury, is in every case dependent on a universal law." It might seem from Mr. Campbell's language (I do not imagine that he means it so) as if Modern Experimental Science had arrived at something more trustworthy than "individual impressions of sense". But the expansion or contraction of the mercury are just as much facts of sense as the feeling of heat or cold; only they are facts of sense determinate and uniform to all, whereas the feeling of heat or cold is indeterminate and liable to differ with different persons. The certainty about "universal law governing the sensations of heat and cold," was not at all felt in the days of Plato.] [Footnote 84: Thus in the Philêbus (pp. 55-56) Plato declares that numbering, measuring, and weighing, are the characteristic marks of all the various processes which deserve the name of Arts; and that among the different Arts those of the carpenter, builder, &c., are superior to those of the physician, pilot, husbandman, military commander, musical composer, &c., because the two first-named employ more measurement and a greater number of measuring instruments, the rule, line, plummet, compass, &c.