When Plato thus narrows the sense of [Greek: ai)/sthêsis], it is easy to prove that [Greek: e)pistê/mê] is not [Greek: ai)/sthêsis]; but I doubt whether those who affirmed this proposition intended what he here refutes. Neither unreflecting men, nor early theorizers, would distinguish the impressions of sense from the feeling of such impressions being _successive, distinct from one another, resembling, &c._ Mr. John Stuart Mill observes (Logic, Book i. chap. iii. sects. 10-13)--"The simplest of all relations are those expressed by the words antecedent and consequent, and by the word simultaneous. If we say dawn preceded sunrise, the fact in which the two things dawn and sunrise were jointly concerned, consisted only of the two things themselves. No third thing entered into the fact or phenomenon at all, unless indeed we choose to call the succession of the two objects a third thing; _but their succession is not something added to the things themselves_, it is something _involved in them_. To have two feelings at all, implies having them either successively or simultaneously. The relations of succession and simultaneity, of likeness and unlikeness, not being grounded on any fact or phenomenon distinct from the related objects themselves, do not admit of the same kind of analysis. But these relations, though not (like other relations) grounded on states of consciousness, are themselves states of consciousness. Resemblance is nothing but our feeling of resemblance: succession is nothing but our feeling of succession." By all ordinary (non-theorising) persons, these familiar relations, _involved_ in the facts of sense, are conceived as an essential part of [Greek: ai)/sthêsis]: and are so conceived by those modern theorists who trace all our knowledge to sense--as well as (probably) by those ancient theorists who defined [Greek: e)pistê/mê] to be [Greek: ai)/sthêsis], and against whom Plato here reasons. These theorists would have said (as ordinary language recognises)--"We _see_ the _dissimilarity_ of the black hands from the white face of the clock; we _hear_ the _likeness_ of one stroke of the clock to another, and the _succession_ of the strokes one, two, three, one after the other".