The contrast between the philosopher and the man engaged in active life--which is so emphatically set forth in the Theætêtus[144]--falls in with the distinction between Knowledge and Opinion--The Infallible and the Fallible. It helps the purpose of the dialogue, to show what knowledge is _not_: and it presents the distinction between the two on the ethical and emotional side, upon which Plato laid great stress. The philosopher (or man of Knowledge, _i.e._ Knowledge viewed on its subjective side) stands opposed to the men of sensible perception and opinion, not merely in regard to intellect, but in regard to disposition, feeling, character, and appreciation of objects. He neither knows nor cares about particular things or particular persons: all his intellectual force, and all his emotional interests, are engaged in the contemplation of Universals or Real Entia, and of the great pervading cosmical forces. He despises the occupations of those around him, and the actualities of life, like the Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias:[145] assimilating himself as much as possible to the Gods; who have no other occupation (according to the Aristotelian[146] Ethics), except that of contemplating and theorising. He pursues these objects not with a view to any ulterior result, but because the pursuit is in itself a life both of virtue and happiness; neither of which are to be found in the region of opinion. Intense interest in speculation is his prominent characteristic. To dwell amidst these contemplations is a self-sufficing life; even without any of the aptitudes or accomplishments admired by the practical men. If the philosopher meddles with their pursuits, he is not merely found incompetent, but also incurs general derision; because his incompetence becomes manifest even to the common-place citizens. But if _they_ meddle with his speculations, they fail not less disgracefully; though their failure is not appreciated by the unphilosophical spectator. [Footnote 144: Plato, Theætêt. pp. 173-176. Compare Republic, v. pp. 476-477, vii. p. 517.] [Footnote 145: See above, chap. xxiv. p. 355.] [Footnote 146: Ethic. Nikomach. x. 8, p. 1178, b. 9-25.] The professors of Knowledge are thus divided by the strongest lines from the professors of Opinion. And opinion itself--The Fallible--is, in this dialogue, presented as an inexplicable puzzle. You talk about true and false opinions: but how can false opinions be possible? and if they are not possible, what is the meaning of _true_, as applied to opinions? Not only, therefore, opinion can never be screwed up to the dignity of knowledge--but the world of opinion itself defies philosophical scrutiny. It is a chaos in which there is neither true nor false; in perpetual oscillation (to use the phrase of the Republic) between Ens and Non-Ens.[147] [Footnote 147: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 478-479.