Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 3Grote, George
Philosophy
Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 3
Grote, George
Philosophy, Ancient; Plato; Socrates, 470 BC-399 BC
Now when I look at these various theories (continues the Eleate),
I find that I do not follow or understand them; and that I know
nothing more or better about Ens than about Non-Ens. I thought, as
a young man, that I understood both: but I now find that I
understand neither.[39] The difficulties about Ens are just as
great as those about Non-Ens. What do these philosophers mean by
saying that Ens is double or triple? that there are two distinct
existing elements--Hot and Cold--or three? What do you mean by
saying that Hot and Cold _exist_? Is existence any thing distinct
from Hot and Cold? If so, then there are three elements in all,
not two. Do you mean that existence is something belonging to both
and affirmed of both? Then you pronounce both to be One: and Ens,
instead of being double, will be at the bottom only One.
[Footnote 40: Plato, Sophist. p. 243 B.]
[Side-note: Whether Ens is Many or One? If Many, how Many?
Difficulties about One and the Whole. Theorists about Ens cannot
solve them.]
Such are the questions which the Eleatic spokesman of Plato puts
to those philosophers who affirm Ens to be plural: He turns next
to those who affirm Ens to be singular, or Unum. Do you mean that
Unum is identical with Ens--and are they only two names for the
same One and only thing? There cannot be two distinct names
belonging to one and the same thing: and yet, if this be not so,
one of the names must be the name of nothing. At any rate, if
there be only one name and one thing, still the name itself is
different from the thing--so that duality must still be
recognised. Or if you take the name as identical with the One
thing, it will either be the name of nothing, or the name of a
name.[41]
[Footnote 41: Plato, Sophist. p. 244 D.]
Again, as to the Whole:--is the Whole the same with the Ens Unum,
or different from it. We shall be told that it is the same: but
according to the description given by Parmenides, the whole is
spherical, thus having a centre and circumference, and of course
having parts. Now a whole divisible into parts may have unity
predicable of it, as an affection or accident in respect to the
sum of its parts: but it cannot be the genuine, essential,
self-existent, One, which does not admit of parts or division. If Ens
be One by accident, it is not identical with One, and we thus have
two existent things: and if Ens be not really and essentially the
Whole, while nevertheless the Whole exists--Ens must fall short of
or be less than itself, and must to this extent be Non-Ens:
besides that Ens, and Totum, being by nature distinct, we have
more things than One existing. On the other hand, if we assume
Totum not to be Ens, the same result will ensue. Ens will still be
something less than itself;--Ens can never have any quantity, for
each quantum is necessarily a whole in itself--and Ens can never
be generated, since everything generated is also necessarily a
whole.[42]
[Footnote 42: Plato, Sophist. p. 245 A-C.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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