He will acknowledge both and each--rest and motion--the constant and the changeable--as making up together total reality or Ens Totum. [Side-note: Motion and rest are both of them Entia or realities. Both agree in Ens. Ens is a _tertium quid_--distinct from both. But how can anything be distinct from both?] Still, however, we have not got over our difficulties. Motion and Rest are contraries; yet we say that each and both are Realities or Entia. In what is it that they both agree? Not in moving, nor in being at rest, but simply in existence or reality. Existence or reality therefore must be a _tertium quid_, apart from motion and rest, not the sum total of those two items. Ens or the Real is not, in its own proper nature, either in motion or at rest, but is distinct from both. Yet how can this be? Surely, whatever is not in motion, must be at rest--whatever is not at rest, must be in motion. How can any thing be neither in motion nor at rest; standing apart from both?[52] [Footnote 52: Plato, Sophist. p. 250 C.] [Side-note: Here the Eleate breaks off without solution. He declares his purpose to show, That Ens is as full of puzzle as Non-Ens,] Here the Eleate breaks off his enquiry, without solving the problems which he has accumulated. My purpose was (he says[53]) to show that Ens was just as full of difficulties and embarrassments as Non-Ens. Enough has been said to prove this clearly. When we can once get clear of obscurity about Ens, we may hope to be equally successful with Non-Ens. [Footnote 53: Plato, Sophist. p. 250 D.] [Side-note: Argument against those who admit no predication to be legitimate, except identical. How far Forms admit of intercommunion with each other.] Let us try (he proceeds) another path. We know that it is a common practice in our daily speech to apply many different predicates to one and the same subject. We say of the same man, that he is fair, tall, just, brave, &c., and several other epithets. Some persons deny our right to do this. They say that the predicate ought always to be identical with the subject: that we can only employ with propriety such propositions as the following--man is man--good is good, &c.: that to apply many predicates to one and the same subject is to make one thing into many things.[54] But in reply to these opponents, as well as to those whom we have before combated, we shall put before them three alternatives, of which they must choose one. 1. Either all Forms admit of intercommunion one with the other. 2. Or no Forms admit of such intercommunion. 3. Or some Forms do admit of it, and others not. Between these three an option must be made.[55] [Footnote 54: Plato, Sophist. p. 251 B. [Greek: ô(s a)du/naton ta/ te polla\ e(\n kai\ to\ e(\n polla\ ei)=nai], &c.] [Footnote 55: Plato, Sophist. p. 251 E.] [Side-note: No intercommunion between any distinct forms. Refuted. Common speech is inconsistent with this hypothesis.]