The Eleate next proceeds to consider, whether these two Genera or Forms--Proposition, Judgment, Opinion, on the one hand, and Non-Ens on the other--are among those which may or do enter into partnership and conjunction with each other. For we have admitted that there are some Forms which cannot come into partnership; and the Sophist against whom we are reasoning, though we have driven him to concede that Non-Ens is a real Form, may still contend that it is one of those which cannot come into partnership with Proposition, Judgment, Opinion--and he may allege that we can neither embody in language, nor in mental judgment, that which _is not_.[79] [Footnote 79: Plato, Sophist. p. 260 C-D-E.] [Side-note: Analysis of a Proposition. Every Proposition must have a noun and a verb--it must be proposition of _Something_. False propositions, involve the Form of Non-Ens, in relation to the particular subject.] Let us look attentively what Proposition, Judgment, Opinion, are. As we said about Forms and letters, so about words: it is not every combination of words which is possible, so as to make up a significant proposition. A string of nouns alone will not make one, nor a string of verbs alone. To compose the simplest proposition, you must put together at least one noun and one verb, in order to signify something respecting things existing, or events past, present, and future.[80] Now every proposition must be a proposition about something, or belonging to a certain subject: every proposition must also be of a certain quality.[81] _Theætêtus is sitting down_--_Theætêtus is flying._ Here are two propositions, both belonging to the same subject, but with opposite qualities: the former true, the latter false. The true proposition affirms respecting Theætêtus real things as they are; the false proposition affirms respecting him things different from real, or non-real, as being real. The attribute of _flying_ is just as real in itself as the attribute of _sitting_: but as respects Theætêtus, or as predicated concerning him, it is different from the reality, or non-real.[82] But still Theætêtus is the subject of the proposition, though the predicate _flying_ does not really belong to him: for there is no other subject than he, and without a subject the proposition would be no proposition at all. When therefore different things are affirmed as the same, or non-realities as realities, respecting you or any given subject, the proposition so affirming is false.[83] [Footnote 80: Plato, Sophist. pp. 261-262.] [Footnote 81: Plato, Sophist. p. 262 E. [Greek: lo/gon a)nagkai=on, o(/tan per ê)=|, tino\s ei)=nai lo/gon; mê\ de/ tinos a)du/naton . . . Ou)kou=n kai\ _poi=o/n tina_ au)to\n ei)=nai dei=?]] [Footnote 82: Plato, Sophist. p. 263 B [Greek: O)/ntôn de/ ge o)/nta e(/tera peri\ sou=.] That is, [Greek: e(/tera tô=n o)/ntôn],--being the explanation given by Plato of [Greek: ta\ mê\ o)/nta].] [Footnote 83: Plato, Sophist. p. 263 D.]