Now the imitative profession may be distributed into those who know what they imitate--and those who imitate without knowing.[85] The man who mimics your figure or voice, knows what he imitates: those who imitate the figure of justice and virtue often pass themselves off as knowing it, yet do not really know it, having nothing better than fancy or opinion concerning it. Of these latter again--(_i.e._ the imitators with mere opinion, but no knowledge, respecting that which sincerely they imitate)--there are two classes: one, those who sincerely mistake their own mere opinions for knowledge, and are falsely persuaded that they really know: the other class, those who by their perpetual occupation in talking, lead us to suspect and apprehend that they are conscious of not knowing things, which nevertheless they discuss before others as if they did know.[86] [Footnote 85: Plato, Sophist. p. 267 A-D.] [Footnote 86: Plato, Sophist. p. 268 A. [Greek: to\ de\ thate/rou schê=ma, dia\ tê\n e)n toi=s lo/gois kuli/ndêsin, e)/chei pollê\n u(popsi/an kai\ pho/bon ô(s a)gnoei= tau=ta a(\ pro\s tou\s a)/llous ô(s ei)dô\s e)schêma/tistai.]] [Side-note: Last class divided--Those who impose on numerous auditors by long discourse, the Rhetor--Those who impose on select auditors, by short question and answer, making the respondent contradict himself--the Sophist.] Of this latter class, again, we may recognise two sections: those who impose upon a numerous audience by long discourses on public matters: and those who in private, by short question and answer, compel the person conversing with them to contradict himself.[87] The man of long discourse is not the true statesman, but the popular orator: the man of short discourse, but without any real knowledge, is not the truly wise man, since he has no real knowledge--but the imitator of the wise man, or Sophist. [Footnote 87: Plato, Sophist. p. 268 B. [Greek: to\n me\n dêmosi/a| te kai\ makroi=s lo/gois pro\s plê/thê dunato\n _ei)rôneu/esthai_ kathorô=; to\n de\ i)di/a| te kai\ brache/si lo/gois a)nagka/zonta to\n prosdialego/menon e)nantiologei=n au)to\n au)tô=|.]] * * * * * [Side-note: Dialogue closed. Remarks upon it. Characteristics ascribed to a Sophist.] We have here the conclusion of this abstruse and complicated dialogue, called Sophistês. It ends by setting forth, as the leading characteristics of the Sophist--that he deals in short question and answer so as to make the respondent contradict himself: That he talks with small circles of listeners, upon a large variety of subjects, on which he possesses no real knowledge: That he mystifies or imposes upon his auditors; not giving his own sincere convictions, but talking for the production of a special effect. He is [Greek: e)nantiopoiologiko\s] and [Greek: ei)/rôn], to employ the two original Platonic words, neither of which is easy to translate.