Yet Plato, in this dialogue, when he is discussing the worth of the reproachful imputation fastened on Lysias, takes the term [Greek: logogra/phos] only in this etymological, literal sense, omitting to notice the collateral association which really gave point to it and made it serve the purpose of a hostile speaker. This is the more remarkable, because we find Plato multiplying opportunities, even on unsuitable occasions, of taunting the Sophists with the fact that they took money. Here in the Phædrus, we should have expected that if he noticed the imputation at all, he would notice it in the sense intended by the speaker. In this sense, indeed, it would not have suited the purpose of his argument, since he wishes to make it an introduction to a philosophical estimate of the value of writing as a means of instruction. Heindorf observes, that Plato has used a similar liberty in comparing the [Greek: logogra/phos] to the proposer of a law or decree. "Igitur, quum solemne legum initium ejusmodi esset, [Greek: e)/doxe tê=| boulê=|], &c., Plato aliter longé quam vulgo acciperetur, neque sine calumniâ quâdam, interpretatus est" (ad p. 258).] [Footnote 61: Plato, Phædrus, p. 259 E. [Greek: o(/pê| kalô=s e)/chei le/gein te kai\ gra/phein, kai\ o(/pê| mê/, skepte/on.]--p. 258 D. [Greek: ti/s o( tro/pos tou= kalô=s te kai\ mê\ gra/phein.]] [Side-note: Question about teaching the art of writing well or speaking well. Can it be taught upon system or principle? Or does the successful Rhetor succeed only by unsystematic knack?.] First let us ask--When an orator addresses himself to a listening crowd upon the common themes--Good and Evil, Just and Unjust--is it necessary that he should know what is really and truly good and evil, just and unjust? Most rhetorical teachers affirm, that it is enough if he knows what the audience or the people generally believe to be so: and that to that standard he must accommodate himself, if he wishes to persuade.[62] [Footnote 62: Plato, Phædrus, p. 260 A.] [Side-note: Theory of Sokrates--that all art of persuasion must be founded upon a knowledge of the truth, and of gradations of resemblance to the truth.]