Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 3Grote, George
Philosophy
Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 3
Grote, George
Philosophy, Ancient; Plato; Socrates, 470 BC-399 BC
He may persuade the people under these circumstances (replies
Sokrates), but if he does so, it will be to their misfortune and
to his own. He ought to know the real truth--not merely what the
public whom he addresses believe to be the truth--respecting just
and unjust, good and evil, &c. There can be no genuine art of
speaking, which is not founded upon knowledge of the truth, and
upon adequate philosophical comprehension of the
subject-matter.[63] The rhetorical teachers take too narrow a view of
rhetoric, when they confine it to public harangues addressed to
the assembly or to the Dikastery. Rhetoric embraces all guidance
of the mind through words, whether in public harangue or private
conversation, on matters important or trivial. Whether it be a
controversy between two litigants in a Dikastery, causing the
Dikasts to regard the same matters now as being just and good,
presently as being unjust and evil: or between two dialecticians
like Zeno, who could make his hearers view the same subjects as
being both like and unlike--both one and many--both in motion and
at rest: in either case the art (if there be any art) and its
principles are the same. You ought to assimilate every thing to
every thing, in all cases where assimilation is possible: if your
adversary assimilates in like manner, concealing the process from
his hearers, you must convict and expose his proceedings. Now the
possibility or facility of deception in this way will depend upon
the extent of likeness between things. If there be much real
likeness, deception is easy, and one of them may easily be passed
off as the other: if there be little likeness, deception will be
difficult. An extensive acquaintance with the real resemblances of
things, or in other words with truth, constitutes the necessary
basis on which all oratorical art must proceed.[64]
[Footnote 63: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 260-261.]
[Footnote 64: Plato, Phædrus, p. 262.]
[Side-note: Comparison made by Sokrates between the discourse of
Lysias and his own. Eros is differently understood: Sokrates
defined what he meant by it: Lysias did not define.]
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