Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 3Grote, George
Philosophy
Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 3
Grote, George
Philosophy, Ancient; Plato; Socrates, 470 BC-399 BC
Though knowledge cannot be first communicated by written matters,
yet if it has been once communicated and subsequently forgotten,
it may be revived by written matters. Writing has thus a real,
though secondary, usefulness, as a memorandum. And Plato doubtless
accounted written dialogues the most useful of all written
compositions, because they imitated portions of that long oral
process whereby alone knowledge had been originally generated. His
dialogues were reports of the conversations purporting to have
been held by Sokrates with others.
[Side-note: Plato's didactic theories are pitched too high to be
realised.]
It is an excellent feature in the didactic theories of Plato, that
they distinguish so pointedly between the passive and active
conditions of the intellect; and that they postulate as
indispensable, an habitual and cultivated mental activity, worked
up by slow, long-continued, colloquy. To read or hear, and then to
commit to memory, are in his view elegant recreations, but nothing
more. But while, on this point, Plato's didactic theories deserve
admiration, we must remark on the other hand that they are pitched
so high as to exceed human force, and to overpass all possibility
of being realised.[127] They mark out an _idéal_, which no person
ever attained, either then or since--like the Platonic theory of
rhetoric. To be master of any subject, in the extent and
perfection required for sustaining and administering a Sokratic
cross-examination--is a condition which scarce any one can ever
fulfil: certainly no one, except upon a small range of subjects.
Assuredly, Plato himself never fulfilled it.
[Footnote 127: A remark made by Sextus Empiricus (upon another
doctrine which he is discussing) may be applied to this view of
Plato--[Greek: to\ de\ le/gein o(/ti tê=| diomalismô=| tô=n
pra/xeôn katalamba/nomen to\n e)/chonta tê\n peri\ to\n bi/on
te/chnên, _u(perphtheggome/nôn e)/sti tê\n a)nthrô/pôn phu/sin_,
kai\ eu)chome/nôn ma=llon ê)\ a)lêthê= lego/ntôn] (Pyrrh. Hyp.
iii. 244).]
[Side-note: No one has ever been found competent to solve the
difficulties raised by Sokrates, Arkesilaus, Karneades, and the
negative vein of philosophy.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account