Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 4Grote, George
Philosophy
Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 4
Grote, George
Philosophy, Ancient; Plato; Socrates, 470 BC-399 BC
This quarrel between philosophy and poetry (continues the Platonic
Sokrates) is of ancient date.[324] I myself am very sensible to
the charms of poetry, especially that of Homer. I should be
delighted if a case could be made out to justify me in admitting
it into our city. But I cannot betray the cause of what seems to
me truth. We must resist our sympathies and preferences, when they
are incompatible with the right government of the mind.[325]
[Footnote 324: Plato, Republic, x. p. 607 B. [Greek: palaia/ tis
diaphora\ philosophi/a| te kai\ poiêtikê=|].]
[Footnote 325: Plato, Republic, x. pp. 607-608.]
[Side-note: Immortality of the soul affirmed and sustained
by argument--Total number of souls always the same.]
To maintain the right government and good condition of the soul or
mind, is the first of all considerations: and will be seen yet
farther to be such, when we consider that it is immortal and
imperishable. Of this Plato proceeds to give a proof,[326]
concluding with a mythical sketch of the destiny of the soul
after death. The soul being immortal (he says), the total
number of souls is and always has been the same--neither
increasing nor diminishing.[327]
[Footnote 326: Plato, Republic, x. pp. 609-610.]
[Footnote 327: Plato, Republic, x. p. 611 A.]
[Side-note: Recapitulation--The Just Man will be happy,
both from his justice and from its consequences, both here and
hereafter.]
I have proved (the Platonic Sokrates concludes) in the preceding
discourse, that Justice is better, in itself and intrinsically,
than Injustice, quite apart from consequences in the way of reward
and honour; that a man for the sake of his own happiness, ought to
be just, whatever may be thought of him by Gods or men--even
though he possessed the magic ring of Gyges. Having proved this,
and having made out the intrinsic superiority of justice to
injustice, we may now take in the natural consequences and
collateral bearings of both. We have hitherto reasoned upon the
hypothesis that the just man was mistaken for unjust, and treated
accordingly--that the unjust man found means to pass himself off
for just, and to attract to himself the esteem and the rewards of
justice. But this hypothesis concedes too much, and we must now
take back the concession. The just man will be happier than the
unjust, not simply from the intrinsic working of justice on his
own mind, but also from the exterior consequences of justice.[328]
He will be favoured and rewarded both by Gods and men. Though he
may be in poverty, sickness, or any other apparent state of evil,
he may be assured that the Gods will compensate him for it by
happiness either in life or after death.[329] And men too, though
they may for a time be mistaken about the just and the unjust
character, will at last come to a right estimation of both. The
just man will finally receive honour, reward, and power, from his
fellow-citizens: the unjust man will be finally degraded and
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