genuine sentiment of Sokrates as to what he _himself_ would feel, and what ought to be (in his conviction) the feeling of every one, after having perpetrated such nefarious acts. But it does not represent the feeling of Archelaus himself, nor that of the large majority of bystanders: both to these latter, and to himself, Archelaus appears an object of envy and admiration.[31] And it would be a fatal mistake, if the peculiar sentiment of Sokrates were accepted as common to others besides, and as forming a sound presumption to act upon: that is, if, under the belief that no ambitious man will voluntarily bring upon himself so much misery, it were supposed that precautions against his designs were unnecessary. The rational and tutelary purpose of punishment is, to make the proposition true and obvious to all--That the wrong-doer will draw upon himself a large preponderance of mischief by his wrong-doing. But to proclaim the proposition by voice of herald (which Plato here proposes) as if it were already an established fact of human nature, independent of all such precautions--would be only an unhappy delusion.[32] [Footnote 30: See above, ch. xxiv., vol. ii., pp. 325-29.] [Footnote 31: Xenophon, Cyropæd. iii. 3, 52-53. Cyrus says:-- [Greek: A)=r' ou)k, ei) me/llousi toiau=tai dia/noiai e)ggenê/sesthai a)nthrô/pois kai\ e)/mmonoi e)/sesthai, prô=ton me\n no/mous u(pa/rxai dei= toiou/tous, di' ô(=n _toi=s me\n a)gathoi=s e)/ntimos kai\ e)leuthe/rios o( bi/os paraskeuasthê/setai_, toi=s _de\ kakoi=s tapeino/s te kai\ a)lgeino\s_ kai\ a)bi/ôtos o( ai)ô\n e)panakei/setai? E)/peita de\ didaska/lous, oi)/mai, dei= kai\ a)/rchontas e)pi\ tou/tois gene/sthai, oi(/tines dei/xousi/ te o)rthô=s kai\ dida/xousi kai\ e)thi/sousi tau=ta dra=|n, e)/st' a)\n e)gge/nêtai au)toi=s, tou\s me\n _a)gathou\s kai\ eu)kleei=s eu)daimonesta/tous_ tô=| o)/nti nomi/zein, tou\s de\ _kakou\s kai\ duskleei=s a)thliôta/tous_ a(pa/ntôn ê(gei=sthai.] Xenophon here uses language at variance with that of Plato, and consonant to that of the fathers of families whom Plato censures. To create habits of just action, and to repress habits of unjust action, society must meet both the one and the other by a suitable response. Assuming such conditional reciprocity to be realised, you may then persuade each agent that the unjust man, whom society brands with dishonour, is miserable ([Greek: oi( kakoi\ _kai\_ duskleei=s]).] [Footnote 32: Xenophon, Economic. xiii. 11. Ischomachus there declares:-- [Greek: Pa/nu ga/r moi dokei=, ô)= Sô/krates, a)thumi/a e)ggi/gnesthai toi=s a)gathoi=s, o(/tan o(rô=si ta\ me\n e)/rga di' au)tô=n katapratto/mena, tô=n de\ o(moi/ôn tugcha/nontas e(autoi=s tou\s mê/te ponei=n mê/te kinduneu/ein e)the/lontas, o(/tan de/ê|.]--Also xiv. 9-10.] [Side-note: Characteristic feature of the Platonic Commonwealth--specialization of services to that function for which each man is fit--will not apply to one individual separately.]