Plato appears so anxious to make out a triumphant case in favour of justice and against injustice, that he forgets not only the reality of things, but the main drift of his own previous reasonings. Nothing can stand out more strikingly, throughout this long and eloquent treatise, than the difference between one society and another: the necessary dependence of every one's lot, partly indeed upon his own character, but also most materially upon the society to which he belongs: the impossibility of affirming any thing generally respecting the result of such and such dispositions in the individual, until you know the society of which he is a member, as well as his place therein. Hence arises the motive for Plato's own elaborate construction--a new society upon philosophical principles. This essentially relative point of view pervades the greater part of his premisses, and constitutes the most valuable part of them. Whether the commonwealth as a whole, assuming it to be once erected, would work as he expects, we will not here enquire. But it is certain that the commonwealth and the individuals are essential correlates of each other; and that the condition of each individual must be criticised in reference to the commonwealth in which he is embraced. Take any member of the Platonic Commonwealth, and place him in any other form of government, at Athens, Syracuse, Sparta, &c.--immediately his condition, both active and passive, is changed. Thus the philosophers, for whom Plato assumes unqualified ascendancy as the cardinal principle in his system, become, when transferred to other systems, divested of influence, hated by the people, and thankful if they can obtain even security. "The philosopher (says Plato) must have a community suited to him and docile to his guidance: in communities such as now exist, he not only has no influence as philosopher, but generally becomes himself corrupted by the contagion and pressure of opinions around him: this is the natural course of events, and it would be wonderful if the fact were otherwise."[54] [Footnote 54: Plato, Republic, vi. pp. 487-488-489 B, 497 B-C. 492 C: [Greek: kai\ phê/sein ta\ au)ta\ tou/tois kala\ kai\ ai)schra\ ei)=nai, kai\ e)pitêdeu/sein a(/per a)\n ou(=toi, kai\ e)/sesthai toiou=ton?] Compare also ix. pp. 592 A, 494 A: [Greek: tou\s philosophou=ntas a)/ra a)na/gkê pse/gesthai u(p' au)tô=n (tou= plê/thous).] And vii. p. 517 A.] [Side-note: Inconsistency of affirming general positions respecting the happiness of the just man, in all societies without distinction.]