This is a question essentially necessary to be answered, when we are called upon to affirm the general principle--"That the just man is happy, and that the unjust man is unhappy". Antipathy and ill-treatment will be the lot of any citizen who challenges opinions which his society cherish as consecrated, or professes such as they dislike. Such was the fate of Sokrates himself at Athens. He was indicted as unjust and criminal ([Greek: A)dikei= Sôkra/tês]), while his accusers, Anytus and Melêtus, carried away the esteem and sympathy of their fellow-citizens generally, as not simply just men, but zealous champions of justice--as resisting the assailants of morality and religion, of the political constitution, and of parental authority. How vehement was the odium and reprobation which Sokrates incurred from the majority of his fellow-citizens, we are assured by his own Apology[60] before the Dikasts. Now it is to every one a serious and powerful cause of unhappiness, to feel himself the object of such a sentiment. Most men dread it so much, like the Platonic Euthyphron, that they refrain from uttering, or at least are most reserved in communicating, opinions which are accounted heretical among their countrymen or companions.[61] The resolute and free-spoken Sokrates braved that odium; which, aggravated by particular circumstances, as well as by the character of his own defence, attained at last such a height as to bring about his condemnation to death. That he was sustained in this unthankful task by native force of character, conscientious persuasion, and belief in the approbation of the Gods--is a fact which we should believe, even if he himself had not expressly told us so. But to call him _happy_, would be a misapplication of the term, which no one would agree with Plato in making--least of all the friends of Sokrates in the last months of his life. Besides, if we are to call Sokrates happy on these grounds, his accusers would be still happier: for they had the same conscientious conviction, and the same belief in the approbation of the Gods: while they enjoyed besides the sympathy of their country men as champions of religion and morality. [Footnote 60: Plato, Apolog. Sokr. pp. 28 A. 37 D. [Greek: pollê/ moi a)pechthei/a ge/gone kai\ pro\s pollou/s], &c.] [Footnote 61: Plato, Euthyphron, p. 3 C-D. [Greek: A)thênai/ois ga/r toi ou) spho/dra me/lei, a)/n tina deino\n oi)/ôntai ei)=nai, mê\ me/ntoi didaskaliko\n tê=s au(tou= sophi/as; o(\n d' a)\n kai\ a)/llous oi)/ôntai poiei=n toiou/tous, thumou=ntai, ei)/t' ou)=n phtho/nô|, ei)/te di' a)/llo ti.] _Euthyphr._ [Greek: Tou/tou me\n pe/ri o(/pôs pote\ pro\s e)me\ e)/chousin, ou) pa/nu e)pithumô= peirathê=nai.] _Sokrat._ [Greek: I)/sôs ga\r su\ me\n dokei=s spa/nion seauto\n pare/chein, kai\ dida/skein ou)k e)the/lein tê\n seautou= sophi/an], &c.] [Side-note: Imperfect ethical basis on which Plato has conducted the discussion in the Republic.]