Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 4Grote, George
Philosophy
Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 4
Grote, George
Philosophy, Ancient; Plato; Socrates, 470 BC-399 BC
I do not here propose to examine the soundness of this argument
(which has been acutely discussed in a good pamphlet by Miss
Hennell--'Essay on the Sceptical Tendency of Butler's Analogy,' p.
15, John Chapman, 1859). It appeared satisfactory to an able
reasoner like Butler: and believers at Athens would have found
satisfaction in similar arguments, when the narratives in which
they believed were pronounced by Sokrates mischievous and
incredible, as imputing to the Gods unworthy acts. For
example--Zeus and Athêne instigate Pandarus to break the sworn
truce between the Greeks and Trojans: Zeus sends Oneirus, or the
Dream-God, to deceive Agamemnon (Plat. Rep. ii. pp. 379-383). Here
are acts (the orthodox reasoner would say) which would be immoral if
it were not for the special command: but Agamemnon and the Greeks
had no right to life or property, much less to any other comforts
or advantages, except what arose from the gift of the Gods. Now
the Gods, on this particular occasion, thought fit to revoke the
right which they had granted, making known such revocation to
Pandarus; who, accordingly, in that particular case, committed no
injustice in trying to kill Menelaus, and in actually wounding
him. The Gods did not give any general command "to cultivate the
spirit and act upon the principles" of perjury and faithlessness:
they merely licensed the special act of Pandarus--_hic et
nunc_--by making known to him that they had revoked the right
of the Greeks to have faith observed with them, at that particular
moment. When any man argues--"Pandarus was instigated by Zeus to
break faith: therefore faithlessness is innocent and authorised:
therefore _I_ may break faith"--this is "a perversion by
wicked and designing men for a horrid purpose, and can mislead
only the weak and enthusiastic".
Farther, If the Gods may by special mandates cause the murder or
impoverishment of particular men by other men to be innocent acts,
without sanctioning any inference by analogy--much more may the
same be said respecting the acts of the Gods among themselves,
which Sokrates censures, _viz._ their quarrels, violent
manifestations by word and deed, amorous gusts, hearty laughter,
&c. These too are particular acts, not intended to lead to
consequences in the way of example. The Gods have not issued any
general command. "Be quarrelsome, be violent," &c. If they are
quarrelsome themselves on particular occasions, they have a right
to be so; just as they have a right to take away any man's life or
property whenever they choose: but _you_ are not to follow
their example, and none but wicked men will advise you to do so.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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