[Footnote 171: Plato, Republ. v. pp. 459 D, 460 C, 461 C.] [Footnote 172: Aristotel. Politic. vii. 16, 10, p. 1335, b. 20. [Greek: Peri\ de\ a)pothe/seôs kai\ trophê=s tô=n gignome/nôn, e)/stô no/mos, mêde\n pepêrôme/non tre/phein; dia\ de\ plê=thos te/knôn, e)a\n ê( ta/xis tô=n e)thô=n kôlu/ê|, mêde\n a)poti/thesthai tô=n gignome/nôn; ô(/ristai ga\r dê\ tê=s teknopoii+/as to\ plê=thos. e)a\n de/ tisi gi/gnêtai para\ tau=ta sunduasthe/ntôn, pri\n ai)/sthêsin e)ggene/sthai kai\ zôê/n, e)mpoiei=sthai dei= tê\n a)/mblôsin; to\ ga\r o(/sion kai\ to\ mê\ diôrisme/non tê=| ai)sthê/sei kai\ tô=| zê=|n e)/stai.] For the text of this passage I have followed Bekker and the Berlin edition. As to the first half of the passage there are some material differences in the text and in the MSS.; some give [Greek: e)thnô=n] instead of [Greek: e)thôn], and [Greek: ô(ri/sthai ga\r dei=] instead of [Greek: ô(/ristai ga\r dê\]. Compare Plato, Theætêt. 149 C.] [Footnote 173: Plato, Republic, v. p. 460 C. [Greek: ta\ de\ tô=n cheiro/nôn (te/kna), kai\ e)a/n ti tô=n e(te/rôn a)na/pêron gi/gnêtai, e)n a)por)r(ê/tô| te kai\ a)dê/lô| katakru/psousin ô(s pre/pei.] Aristot. _ut suprâ_, [Greek: e)/stô no/mos, mêde\n pepêrôme/non tre/phein], &c.] [Footnote 174: Plutarch, Lykurgus, c. 16.] [Side-note: Such regulations disapproved and forbidden by modern sentiment--Variability of ethical sentiment as to objects approved or disapproved.] We here find both these philosophers not merely permitting, but enjoining--and the Spartan legislation, more admired than any in Greece, systematically realising--practices which modern sentiment repudiates and punishes. Nothing can more strikingly illustrate--what Plato and Aristotle have themselves repeatedly observed[175]--how variable and indeterminate is the _matter_ of ethical sentiment, in different ages and communities, while the _form_ of ethical sentiment is the same universally: how all men agree subjectively, in that which they feel--disapprobation and hatred of wrong and vice, approbation and esteem of right and virtue--yet how much they differ objectively, as to the acts or persons which they designate by these names and towards which their feelings are directed. It is with these emotions as with the other emotions of human nature: all men are moved in the same manner, though in different degree, by love and hatred--hope and fear--desire and aversion--sympathy and antipathy--the emotions of the beautiful, the sublime, the ludicrous: but when we compare the objects, acts, or persons, which so move them, we find only a very partial agreement, amidst wide discrepancy and occasionally strong opposition.[176] The present case is one of the strongest opposition. Practices now abhorred as wrong, are here directly commanded by Plato and Aristotle, the two greatest authorities of the Hellenic world: men differing on many points from each other, but agreeing in this: men not only of lofty personal character, but also of first-rate