Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 4Grote, George
Philosophy
Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 4
Grote, George
Philosophy, Ancient; Plato; Socrates, 470 BC-399 BC
The matter to which I here advert, illustrates a material
distinction between some writings of Plato as compared with
others, and between different points of view which his mind took
on at different times. In the Platonic Apology, we find Sokrates
confessing his own ignorance, and proclaiming himself to be
isolated among an uncongenial public falsely persuaded of
their own knowledge. In several other dialogues, he is the same:
he cannot teach anything, but can only cross-examine, test, and
apply the spur to respondents. But the Republic presents him in a
new character. He is no longer a dissenter amidst a community of
fixed, inherited, convictions.[190] He is himself on the throne of
King Nomos: the infallible authority, temporal as well as
spiritual, from whom all public sentiment emanates, and by whom
orthodoxy is determined. Hence we now find him passing to the
opposite pole; taking up the orthodox, conservative, point of
view, the same as Melêtus and Anytus maintained in their
accusation against Sokrates at Athens. He now expects every
individual to fall into the place, and contract the opinions,
prescribed by authority: including among those opinions deliberate
ethical and political fictions, such as that about the gold and
silver earthborn men. Free-thinking minds, who take views of their
own, and enquire into the evidence of these beliefs, become
inconvenient and dangerous. Neither the Sokrates of the Platonic
Apology, nor his negative Dialectic, could be allowed to exist in
the Platonic Republic.
[Footnote 190: Plato, Repub. vii. p. 541.]
[Side-note: Idea of Good--The Chiefs alone know what it
is--If they did not they would be unfit for their functions.]
One word more must be said respecting a subject which figures
conspicuously in the Republic--the Idea or Form of Good. The
chiefs alone (we read) at the end of their long term of study,
having ascended gradually from the phenomena of sense to
intellectual contemplation and familiarity with the unchangeable
Ideas--will come to discern and embrace the highest of all
Ideas--the Form of Good:[191] by the help of which alone,
Justice, Temperance, and the other virtues, become useful and
profitable.[192] If the Archons do not know how and why just and
honourable things are good, they will not be fit for their
duty.[193] In regard to Good (Plato tells us) no man is satisfied
with mere appearance. Here every man desires and postulates that
which is really good: while as to the just and the honourable,
many are satisfied with the appearance, without caring for the
reality.[194]
[Footnote 191: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 533-534.]
[Footnote 192: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505 A.]
[Footnote 193: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 506 A.]
[Footnote 194: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505 D.]
[Side-note: What is the Good? Plato does not know; but
he requires the Chiefs to know it. Without this the Republic would
be a failure.]
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