But while the feeling of spontaneous belief thus readily arises in Plato's mind, following in the wake of his own constructive imagination and ethical or æsthetical sentiment (_fingunt simul creduntque_)--it does not so readily cleave to the theological dogmas in actual circulation around him. In the generation of Gods from Uranus and Gæa--which he as well as other Athenian youths must have learnt when they recited Hesiod with their schoolmasters--he can see neither proof nor probability: he can find no internal ground for belief.[48] He declares himself incompetent: he will not undertake to affirm any thing upon his own judgment: the mystery is too dark for him to penetrate. Yet on the other hand, though it would be rash to affirm, it would be equally rash to deny. Nearly all around him are believers, at least as well satisfied with their creed as he was with the uncertified affirmations of his own Timæus. He cannot prove them to be wrong, except by appealing to an ethical or æsthetical sentiment which they do not share. Among the Gods said to be descended from Uranus and Gæa, were all those to whom public worship was paid in Greece,--to whom the genealogies of the heroic and sacred families were traced,--and by whom cities as well as individuals believed themselves to be protected in dangers, healed in epidemics, and enlightened on critical emergencies through seasonable revelations and prophecies. Against an established creed thus avouched, it was dangerous to raise any doubts. Moreover Plato could not have forgotten the fate of his master Sokrates;[49] who was indicted both for not acknowledging the Gods whom the city acknowledged, and for introducing other new divine matters and persons. There could be no doubt that Plato was guilty on this latter count: prudence therefore rendered it the more incumbent on him to guard against being implicated in the former count also. Here then Plato formally abnegates his own self-judging power, and submits himself to orthodox authority. "It is impossible to doubt what we have learnt from witnesses, who declared themselves to be the offspring of the Gods, and who must of course have known their own family affairs. We must obey the law and believe." In what proportion such submission, of reason to authority, embodied the sincere feeling of Pascal and Malebranche, or the irony of Bayle and Voltaire, we are unable to determine.[50] [Footnote 48: The remark made by Condorcet upon Buffon is strikingly applicable to Plato:--"On n'a reproché à M. de Buffon que ses hypothèses. Ce sont aussi des espèces de fables--mais des fables produites par une imagination active qui a besoin de créer, et non par une imagination passive qui cède à des impressions étrangères" (Condorcet, Éloge de Buffon, ad fin.). [Greek: Au)todi/daktos d' ei)mi/, theo\s de/ moi e)n phresi\n oi)/mas Pantoi/as e)ne/phusen]--(Homer, Odyss. xxii. 347)--the declaration of the bard Phemius.]