As justice consists in each person doing his own work, and not meddling with that of another--so injustice occurs, when a person undertakes the work of another instead of his own, or in addition to his own. The mischief is not great, when such interference takes place only in the subordinate functions: when, for example, the carpenter pretends to do the work of the shoemaker, or _vice versâ_; or when either of them undertake both. But the mischief becomes grave and deplorable, when a man from the subordinate functions meddles with the higher--when a craftsman, availing himself of some collateral support, wealth or party or strength, thrusts himself into the functions of a soldier or auxiliary--or when the Guardian, by similar artifice, usurps the functions of a Chief--or when any one person combines these several functions all at once in himself. Herein consists the true injustice, ruinous to the city: when the line of demarcation is confounded between these three classes--men of business, Guardians, Chiefs. That each of these classes should do its own work, is Justice: that either of them should meddle with the work of the rest, and especially that the subordinate should meddle with the business of the superior, is Injustice, with ruin following in its train.[102] It is from these opposite characteristics that the titles Just or Unjust will be rightfully bestowed upon our city. [Footnote 102: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 434 B-C. [Greek: ê( triô=n a)/ra o)/ntôn genô=n polupragmosu/nê kai\ metabolê\ ei)s a)/llêla, megi/stê te bla/bê tê=| po/lei kai\ o)rtho/tat' a)\n prosagoreu/oito ma/lista kakourgi/a . . . Kakourgi/an de\ tê\n megi/stên tê=s e(autou= po/leôs ou)k a)diki/an phê/seis ei)=nai? . . . chrêmatistikou=, e)pikourikou=, phulakikou=, ge/nous oi)keiopragi/a, . . . dikaiosu/nê t' a)\n ei)/ê, kai\ tê\n po/lin dikai/an pa/rechoi.]] [Side-note: Analogy of the city to the individual--Each man is tripartite, having in his mind Reason, Energy, Appetite. These three elements are distinct, and often conflicting.] We must now apply, as we undertook to do, the analogy of the city to the individual. The just man, so far forth as justice is concerned, cannot differ from the just city. He must therefore have in his own individual mind three distinct parts, elements, or classes, corresponding to the three classes above distinguished in the city. But is it the fact that there are in each man three such mental constituents--three different classes, sorts, or varieties, of mind?