To settle this point as it ought to be settled, would require a stricter investigation than our present dialogue will permit: but we may contribute something towards it.[103] It is manifest that there exist different individuals in whom reason, energy (courage or passion), and appetite, are separately and unequally developed: thus in the Thracians there is a predominance of energy or courage--in the Phoenicians of appetite--in the Athenians, of intellect or reason. The question is, whether we employ one and the same mind for all the three--reason, energy, and appetite; or whether we do not employ a different mind or portion of mind, when we exercise reason--another, when we are under the influence of energy--and a third, when we follow appetite.[104] [Footnote 103: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 435 C. Schleiermacher (in the Introduction to his translation of the Republic, p. 71) considers that this passage of the Republic is intended to note as a desideratum the exposition in the Timæus; wherein the constituent elements of mind or soul are more fully laid down, and its connection with the fundamental elements of the Kosmos.] [Footnote 104: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 436 A.] To determine this question, we must consider that the same thing cannot at the same time do or suffer opposites, in the same respect and with reference to the same thing. The same thing or person cannot at the same time, and in the same respect, both stand still and move. This may be laid down as an universal truth: but since some may not admit it to be so, we will at any rate assume it as an hypothesis.[105] Now in reference to the mind, we experience at the same time various movements or affections contrary to each other: assent and dissent--desire and aversion--the attracting any thing to ourselves, and the repelling it from ourselves: each of these is different from and contrary to the other. As a specimen of desires, we will take thirst. When a man is in this condition, his mind desires nothing else but to drink; and strains entirely towards that object. If there be any thing which drags back his mind when in this condition, it must be something different from that which pulls him forward and attracts him to drink. That which attracts him, and that which repels him, cannot be the same: just as when the archer at the same time pulls his bow towards him and pushes it away from him, it is one of his hands that pulls and another that pushes.[106] Now it often happens that a man athirst refuses to drink: there is something within him that prompts him to drink, and something still more powerful that forbids him. These two cannot be the same: one of them is different from the other: that which prompts is appetite, that which forbids is reason. The rational element of the mind is in like manner something different or distinguishable from all the appetites, which tend towards repletion and pleasure. [Footnote 105: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 437 A.]