Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 1: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 1: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
1. All beings, both primary, as well as those who are so called on any
pretext soever, are beings only because of their unity. What, indeed
would they be without it? Deprived of their unity, they would cease to
be what they are said to be. No army can exist unless it be one. So
with a choric ballet or a flock. Neither a house nor a ship can exist
without unity; by losing it they would cease to be what they are.[187]
So also with continuous quantities which would not exist without unity.
On being divided by losing their unity, they simultaneously lose their
nature. Consider farther the bodies of plants and animals, of which
each is a unity. On losing their unity by being broken up into several
parts, they simultaneously lose their nature. They are no more what
they were, they have become new beings, which themselves exist only so
long as they are one. What effects health in us, is that the parts of
our bodies are co-ordinated in unity. Beauty is formed by the unity of
our members. Virtue is our soul's tendency to unity, and becoming one
through the harmony of her faculties.
THE SOUL MAY IMPART UNITY, BUT IS NOT UNITY.
The soul imparts unity to all things when producing them, fashioning
them, and forming them. Should we, therefore, after rising to the
Soul, say that she not only imparts unity, but herself is unity in
itself? Certainly not. The soul that imparts form and figure to
bodies is not identical with form, and figure. Therefore the soul
imparts unity without being unity. She unifies each of her productions
only by contemplation of the One, just as she produces man only
by contemplating Man-in-himself, although adding to that idea the
implied unity. Each of the things that are called "one" have a unity
proportionate to their nature ("being"); so that they participate in
unity more or less according as they share essence[188] (being). Thus
the soul is something different from unity; nevertheless, as she exists
in a degree higher (than the body), she participates more in unity,
without being unity itself; indeed she is one, but the unity in her
is no more than contingent. There is a difference between the soul
and unity, just as between the body and unity. A discrete quantity
such as a company of dancers, or choric ballet, is very far from being
unity; a continuous quantity approximates that further; the soul gets
still nearer to it, and participates therein still more. Thus from the
fact that the soul could not exist without being one, the identity
between the soul and unity is suggested. But this may be answered
in two ways. First, other things also possess individual existence
because they possess unity, and nevertheless are not unity itself; as,
though the body is not identical with unity, it also participates in
unity. Further, the soul is manifold as well as one, though she be not
composed of parts. She possesses several faculties, discursive reason,
desire, and perception--all of them faculties joined together by unity
as a bond.
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