Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 1: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 1: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
them existence, He has at the same time given them a location. However,
that which needs a location is not (necessarily) self-sufficient.
THE SUPREME, AS SUPERGOODNESS, COULD NOT ASPIRE TO ANYTHING ELSE.
A principle has no need of anything beneath it. The Principle of all
things has no need of any of them. Every non-self-sufficient being is
not self-sufficient chiefly because it aspires to its principle. If the
One aspired to anything, His aspiration would evidently tend to destroy
His unity, that is, to annihilate Himself. Anything that aspires
evidently aspires to happiness and preservation. Thus, since for the
One there is no good outside of Himself, there is nothing that He could
wish. He is the super-good; He is the good, not for Himself, but for
other beings, for those that can participate therein.
THE ONE IS NOT THINKER BUT THOUGHT ITSELF.
Within the One, therefore, is no thought, because there can be no
difference within Him; nor could He contain any motion, because the
One is prior to motion, as much as to thought. Besides, what would
He think? Would He think Himself? In this case, He would be ignorant
before thinking, and thought would be necessary to Him, who fully
suffices to Himself. Neither should He be thought to contain ignorance,
because He does not know Himself, and does not think Himself. Ignorance
presupposes a relation, and consists in that one thing does not know
another. But the One, being alone, can neither know nor be ignorant
of anything. Being with Himself, He has no need of self-knowledge.
We should not even predicate of Him presence with Himself, if we are
to conceive of Him Unity in sheer purity. On the contrary, we should
have to leave aside intelligence, consciousness, and knowledge of
self and of other beings. We should not conceive of Him as being that
which thinks, but rather as of thought. Thought does not think; but
is the cause which makes some other being think; now the cause cannot
be identical with that which is caused. So much the more reason is
there then to say that that which is the cause of all these existing
things cannot be any one of them. This Cause, therefore, must not be
considered identical with the good He dispenses, but must be conceived
as the Good in a higher sense, the Good which is above all other goods.
THE SOUL MUST BE STRIPPED OF FORM TO BE ILLUMINATED BY PRIMARY NATURE.
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