Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 1: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 1: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
1. Is "essence" something different from "being"? Does essence indicate
an abstraction of the other (four categories), and is being, on the
contrary, essence with the other (four categories), motion and rest,
identity and difference? Are these the elements of being? Yes: "being"
is the totality of these things, of which one is essence, the other is
motion, and so forth. Motion, therefore, is accidental essence. Is it
also accidental "being?" Or is it being completely? Motion is being,
because all intelligible things are beings. But why is not each of the
sense-things a being? The reason is, that on high all things form only
a single group of totality, while here below they are distinct one from
another because they are images that have been distinguished. Likewise,
in a seminal (reason), all things are together, and each of them is
all the others; the hand is not distinct from the head; while, on the
contrary, in a body all the organs are separate, because they are
images instead of being genuine beings.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMPLEMENTS OF BEING, AND QUALITIES.
We may now say that, in the intelligible world, qualities are the
characteristic differences in being or essence. These differences
effect distinction between the beings; in short, they cause them to
be beings. This definition seems reasonable. But it does not suit the
qualities below (in the sense-world); some are differences of being,
as biped, or quadruped (as thought Aristotle);[330] others are not
differences, and on that very account are called qualities. Still,
the same thing may appear a difference when it is a complement of
the being, and again it may not seem a difference when it is not a
complement of the being, but an accident: as, for instance, whiteness
is a complement of being in a swan, or in white lead; but in a human
being like you, it is only an accident (as thought Aristotle).[331] So
long as the whiteness is in the ("seminal) reason," it is a complement
of being, and not a quality; if it be on the surface of a being, it is
a quality.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN ESSENTIAL AND MODAL QUALITIES.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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