Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 1: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 1: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
If this (actualization begotten by the First, this external
actualization) be all things, then that (One) is above all things,
and consequently above being. If then (this external actualization)
be all things, and be before all things, it does not occupy the same
rank as the remainder (of all other things); and must, in this respect
also, be superior to being, and consequently also to intelligence; for
there is Something superior to intelligence. Essence is not, as you
might say, dead; it is not devoid of life or thought; for intelligence
and essence are identical. Intelligible entities do not exist before
the intelligence that thinks them, as sense-objects exist before the
sensation which perceives them. Intelligence itself is the things that
it thinks, since their forms are not introduced to them from without.
From where indeed would intelligence receive these forms? Intelligence
exists with the intelligible things; intelligence is identical with
them, is one with them. Reciprocally, intelligible entities do not
exist without their matter (that is, Intelligence).
FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK NINE.
Whether All Souls Form a Single One?
IF ALL SOULS BE ONE IN THE WORLD-SOUL, WHY SHOULD THEY NOT TOGETHER
FORM ONE?
1. Just as the soul of each animal is one, because she is entirely
present in the whole body, and because she is thus really one, because
she does not have one part in one organ, and some other part in
another; and just as the sense-soul is equally one in all the beings
which feel, and just as the vegetative soul is everywhere entirely
one in each part of the growing plants; why then should your soul and
mine not form a single unity? Why should not all souls form but a
single one? Why should not the universal (Soul) which is present in
all beings, be one because she is not divided in the manner of a body,
being everywhere the same? Why indeed should the soul in myself form
but one, and the universal (Soul) likewise not be one, similarly, since
no more than my own is this universal (Soul) either material extension,
or a body? If both my soul and yours proceed from the universal (Soul),
and if the latter be one, then should my soul and yours together form
but a single one. Or again, on the supposition that the universal
(Soul) and mine proceed from a single soul, even on this hypothesis
would all souls form but a single one. We shall have to examine in what
(this Soul which is but) one consists.
SOULS MAY NOT FORM A NUMERIC UNITY, BUT MAY FORM A GENERIC UNITY.
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