Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
2. Granted. But does the soul remember herself? Probably not. He
who contemplates the intelligible world does not remember who he
is; that, for instance, he is Socrates, that he is a soul or an
intelligence. How indeed would he remember it? Entirely devoted to the
contemplation of the intelligible world, he does not by thought reflect
back upon himself; he possesses himself, but he applies himself to
the intelligible, and becomes the intelligible, in respect to which
he plays the part of matter. He assumes the form of the object he is
contemplating, and he then is himself only potentially. Actually, he is
himself only when he thinks the intelligible. When he is himself only,
he is empty of all things, because he does not think the intelligible;
but if by nature he is such that he is all things, in thinking himself,
he thinks all things. In this state, seeing himself actually by the
glance he throws on himself, he embraces all things in this intuition;
on the other hand, by the glance he throws on all things, he embraces
himself in the intuition of all things.
IN THE INTELLIGIBLE SELF-DIRECTION OF THOUGHT IS NOT CHANGEABLENESS.
Under the above circumstances, the soul changes thoughts--something
that we above refused to admit. Intelligence is indeed immutable;
but the soul, situated on the extremities of the intelligible world,
may undergo some change when she reflects upon herself. Indeed, what
applies to the immutable necessarily undergoes some change in respect
to it, because it does not always remain applied to it. To speak
exactly, there is no change when the soul detaches herself from the
things that belong to her to turn towards herself, and conversely;
for the soul is all things, and the soul forms but one thing with
the intelligible. But when the soul is in the intelligible world,
she becomes estranged from herself and from all that belongs to her;
then, living purely in the intelligible world, she participates in
its immutability, and she becomes all that it is; for, as soon as
she has raised herself to this superior region, she must necessarily
unite herself to Intelligence, towards which she has turned, and
from which she is no longer separated by an intermediary. On rising
towards intelligence, the soul attunes herself to it, and consequently
unites herself with it durably, in a manner such that both are
simultaneously single and double. In this state the soul cannot change;
she is immutably devoted to thought, and she simultaneously has
self-consciousness, because she forms a unity with the intelligible
world.
THE SOUL BECOMES WHAT SHE REMEMBERS.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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