Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
The passions do not really belong to the soul, but to the living body,
which is the common part, or the fusion (of both, or the compound).
The body and soul, each taken separately, are self-sufficient. Isolated
and inanimate, the body does not suffer. It is not the body that is
dissolved, it is the unification of its parts. Isolated, the soul is
impassible, indivisible, and by her condition escapes all affections.
But the unification of two things is sure to be more or less unstable,
and on its occurrence, it often happens that it is tested; hence the
pain. I say, "two things," not indeed two bodies, because two bodies
have the same nature; the present is a case where one kind of being
is to be united to one of a different kind, where the inferior being
receives something from the superior being, but receives only a trace
of that something, because of its inability to receive her entirely.
Then the whole comprises two elements, but nevertheless forms only a
unity; which, becoming something intermediary between what it was, and
what it has not been able to become, becomes seriously embarrassed,
because it has formed an unfortunate alliance, not very solid, always
drawn into opposite directions by contrary influences. Thus it is at
one time elated, and at another, dejected; when it is dejected, it
manifests its suffering; when it is elated, it aspires to communion
between the body and the soul.
THE SOUL FEELS THE PASSIONS WITHOUT EXPERIENCING THEM.
19. That is why there is pleasure and pain. That is why grief is said
to be a perception of dissolution, when the body is threatened with
the loss of the image of the soul (of being disorganized by losing the
irrational soul). That is why it is said that pleasure is a perception
produced in the animal when the image of the soul reassumes its sway
over the body. It is the body which undergoes passion; but it is
the sense-potentiality of the soul which perceives the passion by
its relation with the organs; it is she to which all the sensations
ultimately report themselves. The body alone is injured and suffers;
for example, when one member is cut, it is the mass of the body which
is cut; the soul feels pain not merely as a mass, but as a living
mass. It is likewise with a burn: the soul feels it, because the
sense-potentiality as it were receives its reaction by its relations
with the organs. The soul entire feels the passion produced in the body
without however herself experiencing it.
UNLESS THE SOUL WERE IMPASSIBLE SHE COULD NOT LOCALIZE AND MANAGE PAIN.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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