Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
Let us now examine to what beings sensation belongs, and whereby it
operates. Let us see whether sensation can take place even without
organs. Of what use to the earth could sensation be? For it does not
serve the earth as means of knowledge; the knowledge which consists
in wisdom suffices for the beings to whom sensation is of no use.
This consideration might however be denied, for the knowledge of
sense-objects offers, besides utility, some of the charms of the Muses.
Such is, for example, the knowledge of the sun and the other stars,
whose contemplation itself is agreeable. This problem will therefore
demand solution.
RESTATEMENT OF PROBLEMS INVOLVED.
We must therefore first investigate if the earth possess senses, to
what animals sensation naturally belongs, and how sensation operates.
It will be necessary to begin by discussing the doubtful points
that we have indicated, and to examine in general if sensation can
operate without organs, and if the senses have been given for utility,
admitting even that they can procure some other advantage.
CONCEPTIVE THOUGHT DEMANDS THE INTERMEDIARY PROCESS OF SENSATION.
23. Conception of sense-objects occurs when the soul or the living
being experiences perceptions by grasping the bodies' inherent
qualities, and by representing their forms to itself. The soul must
therefore perceive sense-objects either with or without the body. How
could the soul do so alone? Pure and isolated, she can conceive only
what she has within herself; she can only think. But for conception
of objects other than herself, she must previously have grasped them,
either by becoming assimilated to them, or by finding herself united to
something which may have become similar to them.
THE PURE SOUL WOULD REMAIN ISOLATED.
It is impossible for the soul to become similar to sense-objects (in
order to grasp them), by remaining pure. How indeed could a point
become similar to a line? The intelligible line itself could not become
conformed to the sense-line, any more than intelligible fire to the
sense-fire, or the intelligible man to the sense-man. Nature herself
which begets man could not be identical with the begotten man. The
isolated soul, even if she could grasp sense-objects, will finish by
applying herself to the intuition of intelligible objects, because,
having nothing by which to grasp the former, she will let them escape.
Indeed, when the soul perceives from far a visible object, although
only the form reaches her, nevertheless what first began by being for
her indivisible, finally constitutes a subject, whether it be color or
a figure, whose size is determined by the soul.
SENSATION DEPENDS ON THE SENSE-SHAPE, WHICH, LIKE TOOLS, IS
INTERMEDIATE.
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