Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
2. Evidently nature possesses neither hands, nor feet, nor any natural
or artificial instrument. For production its only need is a matter on
which to work, and which it forms. The works of nature exclude all
ideas of mechanical operation; not by any impelling force, nor by
using levers nor machines does it produce varied colors, nor draw the
outlines of objects. Even the workmen who form wax figures, to whose
work the operations of nature are often compared, cannot endue objects
with colors without borrowing them from elsewhere. Besides, we must
observe that these workmen contain a power which remains immutable, and
by the sole means of which they produce their works with their hands.
Likewise, nature contains a power which remains immovable as a whole;
it has no need of some parts that would remain immovable, and others
that move. It is matter alone that undergoes movement, for the forming
power is in no way moved. Were the forming power moved, it would no
longer be the first motor[179]; the first motor would no longer be
nature, but whatever might, in its totality, be immovable.
NATURE IS IMMOVABLE AS A FORM, BUT NOT AS COMPOUND OF MATTER AND FORM.
It may be objected that the ("seminal) reason" may remain immutable,
but that nature is distinct from reason, and is mutable. Considering
the totality of nature, we include reason. Considering only one of
its parts as immutable, this part still will be reason. Nature must
be a form, and not a composite of matter and form. What need would
it have of a matter that might be either cold or hot, since matter,
when subjected to form, either possesses these qualities, or receives
them, or rather undergoes the action of reason before having any
qualities. Indeed, it is not by fire that matter becomes fire, but
by reason. Consequently, in animals and plants, it is the "reasons"
that produce[180]; and nature is a reason that produces other reasons,
imparting some of herself to the substance subjected to her influence,
while remaining within herself. The reason that consists in a visible
shape occupies the last rank; it is dead, and produces nothing. The
living "reason" (which administers the body of the living being), being
sister to the "reason" that produced the visible form (in begetting
the body of the living being), and possessing the same power as this
reason, alone produces within the begotten being.[181]
BOTH NATURE AND REASON ARE CONTEMPLATION; WHILE UNIVERSAL REASON IS
BOTH SOUL AND NATURE.
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