Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
THE BEGETTER OF INTELLIGENCE MUST BE SIMPLER THAN IT, AND IS REACHED
NOT BY INTELLIGENT REASONING BUT A SIMPLE INTUITION.
But what is this Principle, and how are we to conceive it? It must be
either intelligent or not intelligent. If it be intelligent, it will
also be Intelligence. If it be not intelligent, it will be unconscious
of itself, and will not be in any way venerable. Though true, it would
not be clear or perspicuous to say that it is the Good itself, since we
do not yet have an object on which we could fasten our thought when we
speak of it. Besides, since the knowledge of the other objects in all
beings who can know something intelligent, occurs through Intelligence
and lies in Intelligence, by what rapid intellection (or intuition)
could we grasp this Principle that is superior to Intelligence? We
may answer, by that part of us which resembles it; for there is in
us something of it; or rather, it is in all things that participate
in Him. Everywhere you approach the Good, that which in you can
participate receives something of it. Take the illustration of a voice
in a desert, and the human ears that may be located there. Wherever
you listen to this voice, you will grasp it entirely in one sense,
and not entirely in another sense. How then would we grasp something
by approximating our intelligence (to the Good)? To see up there the
Principle it seeks, Intelligence must, so to speak, return backwards,
and, forming a duality, it must somehow exceed itself; that means, it
would have to cease being the Intelligence of all intelligible things.
Indeed, intelligence is primary life, and penetration of all things,
not (as the soul does) by a still actualizing movement,[194] but by a
movement which is ever already accomplished and past.[195] Therefore,
if Intelligence be life, which is the penetration of all things, if
it possess all things distinctly, without confusion--for otherwise
it would possess them in an imperfect and incomplete manner--it must
necessarily proceed from a superior Principle which, instead of being
in motion, is the principle of motion (by which Intelligence runs
through all things), of life, of intelligence, and of all things. The
Principle of all things could not be all things, it is only their
origin. Itself is neither all things, nor any particular thing,
because it begets everything; neither is it a multitude, for it is the
principle of multitude. Indeed that which begets is always simpler than
that which is begotten. Therefore if this principle beget Intelligence,
it necessarily is simpler than Intelligence. On the theory that it is
both one and all, we have an alternative, that it is all things because
it is all things at once, or that it is everything individually. On
the one hand, if it be all things at once, it will be posterior to
all things; if on the contrary it be prior to all things, it will be
different from all things. For if the One co-existed with all things,
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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