Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
6. Whatever be the value of these etymologies, as begotten being is a
form--for it would be impossible to give any other designation to that
which has been begotten by the One--as it is, not a particular form,
but all form, without exception, it evidently results that the One
is formless. As it possesses no form, it cannot be "being," for this
must be something individual, or determinate. Now the One could not
be conceived of as something determined; for then He would no longer
be a principle; He would only be the determined thing attributed to
Him. If all things be in that which has been begotten, none of them
could be unity. If the One be none of them, He cannot be what is above
them; consequently, as these things are "essences and essence," the
One must be above essence. Indeed, the mere statement that the One is
above essence, does not imply any determinateness on His part, affirms
nothing concerning Him and does not even undertake to give Him a name.
It merely states that He is not this or that. It does not pretend to
embrace Him, for it would be absurd to attempt to embrace an infinite
nature. Mere attempt to do so would amount to withdrawing from Him, and
losing the slight trace of Him thereby implied. To see intelligible
Being, and to contemplate that which is above the images of the
sense-objects, none of these must remain present to the mind. Likewise,
to contemplate Him who is above the intelligible, even all intelligible
entities must be left aside to contemplate the One. In this manner we
may attain knowledge of His existence, without attempting to determine
what He is. Besides, when we speak of the One, it is not possible to
indicate His nature without expressing its opposite.[267] It would
indeed be impossible to declare what is a principle of which it is
impossible to say that it is this or that. All that we human beings can
do is to have doubts poignant enough to resemble pangs of childbirth.
We do not know how to name this Principle. We merely speak of the
unspeakable, and the name we give Him is merely (for the convenience
of) referring to Him as best we can. The name "One" expresses no more
than negation of the manifold. That is why the Pythagoreans[268]
were accustomed, among each other, to refer to this principle in a
symbolic manner, calling him Apollo,[269] which name means denial of
manifoldness. An attempt to carry out the name of "One" in a positive
manner would only result in a greater obscuration of the name and
object, than if we abstained from considering the name of "One" as the
proper name of the first Principle. The object of the employment of
this name is to induce the mind that seeks the first Principle first
to give heed to that which expresses the greatest simplicity, and
consequently to reject this name which has been proposed as only the
best possible. Indeed, this name is not adequate to designate this
nature, which can neither be grasped by hearing, nor be understood by
any who hears it named.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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