Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
9. All that is begotten by anything else resides either in the
begetting Principle, or in some other being, in the case of the
existence of any being after or below the generating principle; for
that which was begotten by something else, and which, to exist, needs
something else, needs something else everywhere, and must consequently
be contained within something else. It is therefore natural that the
things which contain the last rank should be contained in the things
which precede them immediately, and that the superior things should
be contained in those which occupy a still more elevated rank, and
so on till the first Principle. As there is nothing above Him, He
could not be contained within anything. Since He is not contained in
anything, and as each other thing is contained in the one immediately
preceding it, the first Principle contains all the other beings; He
embraces them without sharing Himself with them, and possesses them
without being shared by them. Since He possesses them without being
possessed by them, He is everywhere; for, unless He be present, He
does not possess; on the other hand, if He be not possessed, He is not
present. Consequently He both is, and is not present in this sense
that, not being possessed, He is not present; and that, finding Himself
independent of everything, He is not hindered from being nowhere. If
indeed He were hindered from being somewhere, He would be limited
by some other principle, and the things beneath Him could no longer
participate in Him; consequently the divinity would be limited, He
would no longer exist within Himself, and would depend from inferior
beings. All things contained within anything else are in the principle
from which they depend. It is the contrary with those which are
nowhere; there is no place where they are not. If indeed there be a
place lacking the divinity, evidently this place must be embraced
by some other divinity, and the divinity is in some other; whence,
according to this hypothesis, it is false that the divinity is nowhere.
But as, on the contrary, it is true that the divinity is nowhere, and
false that He is anywhere, because He could not be contained in any
other divinity, the result is that the divinity is not distant from
anything. If then He, being nowhere, be not distant from anything, then
He will in himself be everywhere. One of his parts will not be here,
while another is there; the whole of Him will not be only in one or
another place. The whole of Him will therefore be everywhere; for there
is no one thing which exclusively possesses Him, or does not possess
Him; everything is therefore possessed by Him. Look at the world: as
there is no other world but Him, He is not contained in a world, nor
in any place. No place, indeed, could exist anteriorly to the world.
As to its parts, they depend from it, and are contained within it. The
Soul is not contained in the world; on the contrary, it is the Soul
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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