Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
when it followed the magnitude that involved it in its extension.
If matter ever happened to be stripped of this garment, it would
nevertheless remain what itself was before; for it possesses magnitude
only in so far as form by its presence makes it great.[88]
IF MATTER WERE A PRIMARY PRINCIPLE, IT WOULD BE THE FORM OF THE
UNIVERSE, SUCH AS SOUL IS.
As the soul possesses the forms of beings, and as she herself is a
form, she possesses all things simultaneously.[89] Containing all the
forms, and besides seeing the forms of sense-objects turning towards
her, and approaching her, she is not willing to accept them, along with
their manifoldness. She considers them only after making abstractions
of their mass; for the soul could not become other than she is.[90]
But as matter does not have the strength to resist, possessing as it
does no special characteristic activity, and being no more than an
adumbration, matter yields to everything that active power proposes to
inflict on it. Besides, that which proceeds from intelligible (nature)
possesses already a trace of what is to be produced in matter. That is
how discursive reason which moves within the sphere of representative
imagination, or the movement produced by reason, implies division; for
if reason remained within unity and identity, it would not move, but
remain at rest. Besides, not as the soul does, can matter receive all
forms simultaneously; otherwise it would be a form. As it must contain
all things, without however containing them in an indivisible manner,
it is necessary that, serving as it does as location for all things,
it should extend towards all of them, everywhere offering itself to
all of them, avoiding no part of space, because it is not restricted
within any boundary of space, and because it is always ready to receive
what is to be. How then does it happen that one thing, on entering into
matter, does not hinder the entrance of other things, which, however,
cannot co-exist with the former thing? The reason is that matter is
not a first principle. Otherwise, it would be the very form of the
universe. Such a form, indeed, would be both all things simultaneously,
and each thing in particular. Indeed the matter of the living being is
divided as are the very parts of the living being; otherwise nothing
but reason[91] would exist.
MATTER AS MOTHER, NURSE, RESIDENCE, AND "OTHER" NATURE.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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